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Past research on marriage timing in Asia has found the modernization framework 
to be insufficient for explaining and understanding the processes of marriage and non-
marriage. Using insights provided by research on marriage timing in Western societies, 
we examine the determinants of marriage and non-marriage for Indonesian men and 
women using the 1993 and 1997 waves of the Indonesian Family Life Survey dataset. 
Using a logit and a hierarchical model we examine the characteristics of unmarried men 
and women at time 1 who had married by time 2. We find that the basic correlates of the 
process of industrialization – education and work-force participation have counter-
intuitive associations with marriage. While level of education does nothing to delay 
marriage, being enrolled in school keeps people away from marriage. Work force 
participation in contrast increases the odds of people’s marriage while earnings from 
work have no effect. Based on our results we argue that the processes of marriage and 
non-marriage are best understood using a life course perspective. The life course 
 
perspective examines how the social context that people live in influences their lives, and 
determines their life trajectories, and the choices they make. Seen from this perspective, 
events such as marriage are a part of a person’s life course that follows a normative 
sequence. People get married at that stage in their life when they are considered ready for 
it. When they are in school they are viewed as minors who are not suited to starting and 
raising a family whereas people who are working are viewed as adults who have the 
stability to take on the responsibilities of a married life.
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The age at marriage has been rising steadily in Asia. For example, in Southeast Asia, the 
singulate mean age at marriage for women in Indonesia increased from 19 in 1961 to 21 
in 1991 (U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1995). An examination of tables 1 and 2 shows 
substantial declines in the proportions of married Indonesian women between 1993 and 
1997. For example, 49.41% of the Indonesian women aged 20-21 were married in 1993. 
By comparison, in 1997, this number had reduced to 43.44% - a decline of 6.97 
percentage points. Similarly, declines in the proportion married can be seen for 
Indonesian men after age 24.  
 
----Tables 1 and 2 about here---- 
 
 
In South Asia too, the singulate mean age at marriage for women in India increased from 
16 in 1961 to 19 in 1991 (Das and Dey 1996). In the Middle East also, the average age at 
marriage has been increasing. In Jordan, the singulate mean age at marriage for women 
increased by a year in the single decade of the 90s (DHS 1990, 1997). Such rapid changes 




A shift in marriage timing that increase the length of the celibate period has the potential 
to bring about wide ranging changes in society. It spawns new adolescent and youth 
cultures (Xenos and Gultiano 1992), changes fertility patterns (Dixon 1971, Rindfuss and 
Morgan 1983), can modify the relationship between spouses, and between spouses and 
affinal kin, and can change the age and life course sequencing at sexual initiation as well.   
 
The last aspect is increasingly becoming relevant in the study of HIV/AIDS. Since delays 
in marriage may lead to a change in the sequence of sexual initiation and marriage (Feng 
and Quanhe 1996; Blanc and Way 1998), the likelihood of young people having multiple 
sexual partners increases thereby increasing the likelihood of the spread of HIV/AIDS 
(Caldwell and Caldwell 1993; Meekers and Klein 2002).  
 
There has been surprisingly little recent research on this trend of increasing age at 
marriage in Asia despite the fact that it indicates a rapid change in the value systems of 
Asian societies (Mensch et al. 2005). In the past, there was more research on this topic 
for Asia but it was done mostly because age at marriage is a proximate determinant of 
fertility. However, with the decline in Asian fertility, research interest in age at marriage 
declined. It is now occasionally mentioned as part of a cluster of variables relating to 
gender inequality and women’s status, since lower ages at marriage are associated with 
low status of women (Mason 1986). A trend towards delaying marriage may be 
associated with increasing status of women in society, which may be tied to their growing 
role as economic agents (United Nations Commission on Population and Development 




Current research on age at marriage focuses more on the West, since delayed marriages 
and non-marriages are a part of a larger set of changes taking place in the Western 
family. These changes have been called “the second demographic transition” (Lesthaeghe 
1995; Van de Kaa 1987) and include an increase in cohabitation, childlessness, and non-
marital childbearing. Since these correlates of changes in marriage timing have 
significant policy relevance for the West, the body of literature on this topic is fairly 
large. 
 
With regard to Asia, only Japan has received attention in the area of delayed marriage 
(see Raymo 2003), since here too the social changes accompanying delayed marriage 
mirror those in the West and have policy relevance for Japanese society. The lack of 
research on this topic for other Asian countries has meant that the social changes 
occurring in several Asian countries have not been adequately documented.  
 
This dissertation is a step towards filling this research gap. We will be examining the 
changes in marriage timing specifically for Indonesia and will consider the role played by 
increasing labor force participation and education in Indonesia. Additionally, we will 
examine the changes in the odds of marriage in a cross-sectional and a dynamic 
perspective, that is, we will look at the correlates of odds of marriage among Indonesian 
men and women in 1993 and at the correlates of becoming married between 1993 and 




Increased education and labor force participation are widely seen as consequences of the 
process of industrialization and modernization. Since Indonesia has witnessed rapid 
economic growth for several decades, this is often assumed to be the reason for the 
changes occurring in the area of marriage and the family (Xenos and Gultiano 1992).  
The reasoning often is that as non-Western societies industrialize, they resemble Western 
societies more closely. Sociologists call this line of thinking the modernization paradigm 
(Rostow 1963; Kuznets 1955). However, past research on divorce for Malaysia (Jones 
1981) and on marriage timing in Central Java, a province in Indonesia (Malhotra 1997) 
shows that we need to be cautious with such reasoning. Jones’ research shows that 
divorce rates in Malaysia actually declined with the onset of industrialization, while 
Malhotra’s research shows that traditional gender norms in Indonesia were often 
reinforced with the process of modernization.  
 
The literature on marriage timing for the United States and countries in Western Europe 
often investigates marriage timing as an issue about the life course.  The relationship 
between life course events like education, workforce participation, and marriage is one of 
compatibility. Research indicates that education and marriage are often seen as 
incompatible life events, while workforce participation and marriage are usually seen as 





In this dissertation we will examine how the two theories – modernization and the life-
course – help us understand the relationship between education, workforce participation, 
and marriage timing in Indonesia. 
 
We will examine these changes for both men and women. Often in the demographic 
literature the focus with regard to age at marriage is on women. However, since marriage 
timing has changed for men and women (Xenos and Gultiano 1992), a one-sided focus on 
only women may lead us to neglect important differences between the sexes. Moreover, 
research on the United States indicates that a lot of the shifts in marriage timing may be 
driven by men’s circumstances compared to women’s, making it necessary to examine 







Marriage timing in developing countries: 
 
Discussion of age at marriage and marriage timing in developing countries has focused 
on its role in fertility decline and in enhancing women’s status. Since age at marriage is a 
proximate determinant of fertility in societies where entry into marital unions coincides 
with entry into a sexual union (Davis and Blake 1956; Bongaarts 1978), it has been a key 
variable in the fertility studies on pre-transition Asia. These studies were largely country 
level analyses that focused on women. These published works examined various aspects 
of marriage and fertility like contraceptive use, length of the first birth interval, and 
completed fertility.  
 
In this review I will examine the literature on marriage timing for both developed and 
developing countries. There are important differences in the literature. For developing 
countries the literature focuses on fertility and women’s status, while for developed 
countries the literature examines shifts in marriage timing as a function of the life course. 
I will examine each in turn and discuss their implications for this research. 
 
Studies on the relationship between marriage and fertility in Asia include Ruth Dixon’s 
(1971) work on cross-national variations in age at marriage, which she links to variations 
in marriage markets (measured as the ratio of males 25-29 to females 20-24, and males 
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20-44 to females 15-39), socio-economic circumstances of couples (measured as GNP 
per capita, percent males in the labor force, and percent males in agriculture), and the 
availability of economic and social security outside marriage (percent of women in the 
labor force, percent women who are educated, and the number of children per married 
women). Her finding that while celibacy and delayed marriages occurred in the poorer 
countries of the west, they occurred in the richer countries of the East, indicate that 
socioeconomic development does not always lead to delays in marriage timing. They are 
linked with the values of the society’s elite on one hand compared to the affordability of 
children and a family on the other.  
 
Other important works include Hirschman’s (1985) research that found that contrary to 
expectations, the later marriages were associated with shorter intervals between marriage 
and the first birth. Rindfuss and Morgan (1983) explained this anomaly by stating that a 
large proportion of late marriages in Asia were based on romantic love that led to an 
increase in coital frequency leading to the shortening of the first birth interval.   
 
Once the demographic transition got underway however, interest in this area diminished. 
As a result, there is very little literature on Asian marriage trends and determinants after 
the 1970s and the early 1980s. Some of this neglect was covered by the women’s status 
literature that used age at marriage as an indicator for women’s status since low ages at 




Jones (1981) for instance talks of how in the 1950s, Malaysian women were not allowed 
to decide when they would get married or to whom, as they were not expected to know 
anything about such matters. They accepted, and were expected to accept, whatever their 
parents arranged for them. This is true for women in the Indian subcontinent as well. For 
this reason, Mason (1986) has listed age at marriage for women as a useful indicator of 
their status in developing countries, as a part of her larger thesis on the variables that 
serve as indicators of women’s status, women’s empowerment, and women’s autonomy 
in developing countries. The variable has also been used by Kishor (2000) as one of the 
indicators of women’s status in her examination of the association between women’s 
empowerment and child health in Egypt.  
 
While examining the association between women’s empowerment and age at marriage, 
we need to be cautious about the element of reverse causality. Mason (Mason 1987 cited 
in Balk 1994) points out, that increasing levels of women’s labor force participation may 
actually be a result of their delayed marriage instead of the other way around as is usually 
hypothesized. Sathar et al. (1988) also recognize this problem and state that a delay in 
marriage for extraneous reasons such as an inability to find a suitable alliance at a 
particular time, may lead to women being gainfully employed, or continuing their 
education till such a time that they get married.  
 
Sathar et al’s. analysis of women’s status and marriage age in Pakistan found that a delay 
in marriage allows women to “formulate opinions and develop an independent 
personality” (Sathar et al. 1988, pp 418). Such women were less likely to be dominated 
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by their elders and less vulnerable to the “opinions, orders, and sanctions of their in-laws, 
and husbands” (Sathar et al. 1988, pp. 418).   
 
While most of the literature shows positive associations between marriage age and 
women’s status, there are some studies, like Balk’s (1994) study of Bangladesh, that 
show counter-intuitive trends. Her analysis found that Bangladeshi women who married 
later were significantly less likely to be able to move freely outside their home, and were 
less likely to hold progressive attitudes. Balk’s explanation for such results is that 
increases in age at marriage alone do not improve women’s autonomy. It is only when 
other correlates also change that autonomy is increased. These findings are however rare 
instances. In general, a delay in marriage by Asian women is seen to be indicative of their 
increasing levels of empowerment and autonomy which may show up through their 
increasing labor force participation, their levels of education, and their ability to choose 
their own spouses, as well as to dissolve marriages that don’t work out.   
 
From the point of view of this analysis, the women’s status literature provides useful 
insights into the relationship between marriage timing and modernization theory. Before 
we examine this link in more detail, it is useful to get an understanding of the elements of 
modernization theory. 
 
The classic modernization theory links economic development, indexed by 
industrialization and urbanization, to a whole range of changes occuring in developing 
countries. Some of its key proponents were Rostow (1963), Hoselitz (1960), and Kuznets 
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(1955). Rostow’s (1963) theory links the modernization of society to technological 
change, and states that the evolution of modern industrial society from pre-industrial 
society is essentially an evolution of science and technology. Hoselitz’s (1960) ideas are 
based on Talcott Parson’s theories and articulates the idea that pre-modern societies are 
characterized by personal relationships, ascribed statuses, and an orientation to the 
collective. In contrast modern societies are said to be characterized by impersonal 
relationships, achieved statuses, and self-interest. Kuznet’s (1955) theory of 
modernization argues that economic development will ultimately lead to a more equitable 
society. Using mathematical models he demonstrates that development eventually leads 
to reductions in income inequality. While all of these theories differ in their details, their 
main point is the same: economic development is the key reason why social structures 
and value systems change.  
 
Gender theorists like Boserup (1970) have borrowed the ideas of the modernization 
theorists and have argued that as levels of economic development increase, gender 
inequality decreases, since economic development raises the status of women by 
increasing their participation in the industrial economy, and by improving their levels of 
education. It is from this idea that the link between modernization and age at marriage 
emerges. Researchers have argued that a delay in marriage for women is linked to their 
growing role as economic agents, which gives them economic independence from men, 
and through it, leads to their emancipation from the institution of marriage (Malhotra, 
1997; United Nations Commission on Population and Development 2002, cited in 
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Mensch et al. 2005). Consequently, as their education levels improve and their workforce 
participation levels increase, women’s ages at marriage also increase. 
 
The link that modernization theories draw between economic development and women’s 
marriage timing has been criticized by Malhotra (1997). Her research on the Indonesian 
province of Central Java (one of the few works on marriage timing in Indonesia) found 
that economic development had a different impact on urban women’s lives depending on 
which dimension of their life was being examined. While western education (measured 
by levels of education) improved an urban woman’s ability to choose her spouse, it led to 
lower workforce participation and encouraged the adoption of norms that supported the 
economic dependence of women on men. In this case, education lowered the likelihood 
that women would delay marriage, while workforce participation did nothing to either 
delay or advance the age at marriage. In contrast, in rural areas, where the exposure to 
western education was lower, increased labor force participation increased the likelihood 
that women will delay marriage.    
 
Similarly, Malhotra and Tsui’s (1996) work on Sri Lanka found that traditional marriage 
norms coexist with increased access to schooling and participation of women in the labor 
force. They found that increased education and participation in the labor force is 
primarily a means of increasing a woman’s chances in the marriage market. It is also a 
means of allowing her to collect her own dowry. In Sri Lanka, participation in the labor 
force increased the likelihood of late marriage only for those women who valued it as a 
source of income, and did not have an impact on those women who considered jobs 
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unimportant. Similar findings, that labor force participation doesn’t have an empowering 
association with women’s marriage timing, has been reported by Caldwell, Reddy, and 
Caldwell (1982) for girls in South India. 
 
Research on Malaysia by Jones (1981) provides support for the modernization theory. 
Jones found that women’s ages at marriage increased sharply from 17 in the 1950s to 
21.4 in the 1970s, with increased urbanization, expansion of education for women, and 
women’s participation in the “modern” sector of the economy (quotes in original). 
Although he doesn’t explicitly test for it, Jones also mentions “vast changes in the 
attitudes of parents and children” as having increased the age at marriage1 (Jones 1981).   
 
Very recently Mensch et al. (2005) published a paper where they discuss the trends in age 
at marriage in the developing world. Their macro level analysis compares the declines in 
the proportion of young people who marry early across different regions of the 
developing world. The authors have found that with the exception of men and women in 
South America and men in South and South East Asia, substantial declines have occurred 
across the world in the proportion of young people who are married.  
 
Using census data from the United Nations and the Demographic and Health Surveys, the 
authors analyze ages at marriage in the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
(henceforth LAC countries) and countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Their primary variables 
of interest are education and urbanization, which are key correlates of the process of 
modernization. While improved education accounts for about half or more of the declines 
                                                 
1 Jones does not specify what these changes are.  
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in marriage for women in about 60% of the countries, it does not explain the entire 
decline. The variable was not significant for men. Similarly, increased urbanization was 
not significantly associated with declines in marriage for either men or women. The 
authors argue that it is possible that other factors like declines in arranged marriage, 
changes in the laws regarding marriage age, and difficulty in paying bride-price/dowry, 
may also account for these declines in the proportion of married persons. They don’t 
however test for the association between these variables and the declines in the 
proportion of young married persons due to data limitations.  
 
Marriage timing in developed countries: 
While the treatment of marriage in the developing country context centers on either 
fertility or women’s status, the treatment of this variable in the developed countries is 
rather different.  The fertility aspect of marriage and family formation in developed 
countries is by and large limited to the literature that discusses pre-transition Europe 
(Coale and Treadway 1986 cited in Hirschman 1994). Most studies, however, concentrate 
on understanding the nature of the western family and the changes that have come about 
in it from the 19th century to the modern times, particularly in response to 
industrialization and its correlates.  
 
Some early classics include works by Hajnal (1953, 1954, and 1982) and Goode (1963) 
and their focus is on the changing nature of the Western family with the onset of 
industrialization. The major contribution of these early works is that they destroyed the 
myth that Western societies in pre-industrial times had low ages at marriage like the 
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developing countries in Asia. As Thornton (2001) argues, there is a tendency in the 
marriage and the family literature to assume that Western society once resembled the 
developing countries in Asia, and that the past of the Western societies can be understood 
through an understanding of present day Asia. These early works indicated that having an 
evolutionary perspective may not necessarily aid in understanding modern Europe or 
America.  
 
Goode (1963) found that age at marriage was high in Western societies in pre-industrial 
times since attaining financial stability at an early age was a problem for farmers, 
servants, and apprentices. Financial problems increased the age at marriage, and early 
marriage was possible only for the landed and the aristocracy. With the onset of 
industrialization, the attainment of financial stability at a younger age became possible, 
and the age at marriage declined. In the mid 20th century, the average age at marriage for 
both men and women was in the early twenties (Goode 1963).   
 
Hajnal (1954) explains that while industrialization led to a decline in the age at marriage 
on one hand, it also led to an increase in the rate of marriage on the other. Different 
socio-economic classes contributed differentially to this marriage boom (Hajnal 1954a, 
1954b). Marriage rates were higher amongst urban, educated persons (Hajnal 1954a). 
They were also high amongst people employed in the industrial labor force compared to 
those in agriculture. These are counter-intuitive trends since we would expect people in 
the industrial era to postpone marriage because of “the lengthening period of education 
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and training, the emancipation of women, and the increase in the proportion of people 
engaged in middle class “white collar” occupations…” (Hajnal 1954b pp. 300).  
 
Hajnal (1982) also argues that the high ages at marriage in the West in pre-industrial 
times were the basis for the formation of a family system that was very different from the 
family system in Asia. While the Asian societies, especially India and China, were 
characterized by joint household patterns, the Northwest European societies were 
characterized by simple households. According to Hajnal, the reason for the difference 
between the two household systems was the late age at marriage (over 26 for men and 
over 23 for women), since a higher age at marriage allowed young people to be 
physically mobile and take up work as servants in order to become financially stable. 
After marriage, the couples were able to set up their own household instead of relying on 
their parents for support (Hajnal 1982).  
 
More recently, the trend in Western societies has been towards postponing marriage. 
Much has been written about this trend because of its association with the other changes 
in the Western family structure such as increased cohabitation, divorce, childlessness, and 
out of wedlock childbearing. Lesthaeghe (1995) and Van de Kaa (1987) have called this 
trend the second demographic transition. They argue that the growing secularization and 
individualism in Europe has led to people postponing marriage. Young people want their 
autonomy, and they are unwilling to adjust to the stresses and demands of marriage. 
According to them, the first demographic transition, i.e., the shift from a regime of high 
fertility to one of low fertility came about because of the increased emphasis on quality of 
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children as opposed to the quantity of children (Van de Kaa 1987). Van de Kaa (1987) 
calls this the “king child with married parents” model. In contrast, the second 
demographic transition refers to the shift from this to the “king pair with child” model, 
which points to the trend towards growing individualism. 
 
Apart from these more sociological theories that try to explain the decline of marriage in 
the West, studies with a more economic orientation have examined if marriage has lost its 
economic significance. Timothy Guinnane (1991) examined non-marriage in Ireland at 
the turn of the 20th century, and he concludes that marriage had lost its economic 
significance in Ireland. One reason why people marry is to have children who provide 
security in the parents’ old age and provide labor to work on farms. However, as 
farmlands provided more economic security to people, and local labor became more 
abundant, people did not need to rely on children to provide economic support or labor. 
Many farmers entered long-term relationships with young people that provided surrogate 
heirship for their farms. Guinnane argues that such effective economic substitutes for 
marriage and children led to the decline of the institution in Ireland at the turn of the 20th 
century.  
 
Easterlin’s (1978) relative income, relative cohort-size theory is also an economic theory 
of marriage postponement. The focus of this thesis is mainly fertility, but it also discusses 
marriage timing. Easterlin argues that if a person’s economic prospects are not good 
enough to provide them with their expected standard of living in their adulthood, then 




A concept that has been gaining importance in the Western marriage literature is that of 
marriage markets. This has been getting a lot of attention primarily because there are 
differentials in marriage rates along the dimensions of race and class.  
 
Edin’s (2000) research on poor single mothers in the United States shows that the low 
rates of marriage for this group of women is linked to the scarcity of marriageable men in 
their networks. In this case being marriageable is defined as someone who has a job that 
brings in a regular income. In most cases, this group of women perceived the men in their 
networks as being dependent on their (the women’s) own income, and therefore being a 
burden on them rather than a helpmate. Her research also provides a contrary view to that 
proposed by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa since she argues that marriage rates are low not 
because these women value marriage too little, but because they value it too highly. They 
don’t want to settle for anything less that an ideal married life. This makes men who are 
unable to provide such a quality of life poor candidates in the marriage market. 
 
Some of the most influential research on marriage markets has been done by Valerie 
Oppenheimer (1977, 1988, 1994, and 2003). Oppenheimer (1988) argues that marriage 
timing depends on when each spouse gets a stable job, since this determines a couple’s 
lifestyle and socioeconomic status. If a society has highly segregated gender roles, then 
men can be expected to marry later, and women earlier. Conversely, when women’s 





Expanding on this theme, Oppenheimer introduces the concept of assortative mating. 
Assortative mating recognizes the idea that people don’t marry just anyone, but instead 
evaluate similarity of their potential mates in terms of current and future characteristics, 
before committing to marry that person. Future expectations are evaluated in terms of a 
person’s job prospects, and poor prospects for many people may lead to a squeeze in 
marriage markets. She argues when adult male and female work roles converge, and 
financial stability before marriage is required of both, the future prospects of both sexes 
become more uncertain, leading to an increase in the female age at marriage. In such 
cases, the idea of “double income” families becomes key to understanding the delay in 
marriages especially for women. As Oppenheimer (1977) states, in such cases 
maintenance of status may require that the wife have a highly regarded and well paying 
job. 
 
Research on marriage for developing countries also often includes marriage markets. For 
instance in his article on marriage in Malaysia, Jones says that there was a “marriage 
squeeze” (quotes in original) in Malaysia in the 1960s because of a paucity of men of 
marriageable age. The abundance of women of marriageable age (15-19 and 20-24) 
meant that women had to wait longer to get married, thereby increasing the average age 
at marriage. An additional adjustment the Malays made in response to the marriage 
squeeze was to narrow the spousal age gap. However, the main adjustment was the 




The role of women’s economic independence in bringing about the decline in marriage 
rates is a key theme in the Western marriage literature. In particular people have focused 
on the increasing levels of education and workforce participation among women, which 
are significant outcomes of industrialization and modernization (for a review of this 
literature see Oppenheimer 1994). The theoretical pathway that linked women’s 
economic independence to marriage timing was outlined by Becker (Becker 1981 cited in 
Oppenheimer 1994).  
 
Becker argued that with increasing women’s workforce participation, marriage becomes 
less desirable for two reasons: one, children become more expensive since they pose 
challenges to women’s time use. Women find it increasingly difficult to take care of 
children as they need to spend their time working. This leads to a reduced desire for 
children and consequently marriage since Becker feels that a major reason for marriage is 
having children. Empirical support for this hypothesis was found by Barber and Axinn 
(1998) in their research on the United States. Using data from the Detroit metropolitan 
area they show that in choosing between marriage and cohabitation young women who 
want children are more likely to choose marriage compared to cohabitation2. 
 
Another reason for the declines in marriage according to Becker is the lack of distinction 
in the roles of the husband and wife with increasing women’s labor-force participation. 
Becker argues that a major gain from marriage is the mutual dependence between 
husband and wife that results from each specializing in a different role. There existed an 
                                                 
2 In contrast, men who wanted children entered in any type of co-residential union, whether marriage or 
cohabitation (Barber and Axinn 1998) 
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understanding that the husbands would be the earners while the women took care of the 
home and children. However, as more women join the labor force, their economic 
dependence on men is reduced thereby reducing the incentive to get married. Becker 
further argues that welfare payments to women similarly reduce their incentive to getting 
married. The implication of this theory is that women’s workforce participation reduces 
the rates of marriage.  
 
Empirical research by Oppenheimer revealed that this theory was problematic. Her data 
show that non-marriage rates in the mid 1990s were similar to the rates at the turn of the 
20th century. Further, her research shows that women’s labor force participation either 
has no impact on marriage or it has a positive impact. This is supported by other studies 
(Cherlin 1980, Goldscheider and Waite 1986, Bennet et al 1989, and Lichter et al 1992 
cited in Oppeheimer 1994). Similarly, a rise in school leaving age resulting from an 
increase in their educational attainment did not have an impact on their late age at 
marriage.  
 
Oppenheimer’s explanation for the finding that women’s workforce participation 
increases marriage rates is linked to her concepts of assortative-mating and marriage 
markets. She argues that a woman’s earnings may have an impact on her marriage by 
offsetting the low earnings of her husband. Further, a serious work involvement may 
provide her with greater access to marriage markets and thereby promote assortative 
mating. Work also provides funds for leisure activities, which can expand women’s 
marriage market boundaries. Further, women with a regular career may be able to afford 
 
21
to marry men who don’t have good economic prospects, but have other desirable 
qualities. She further argues that a distinction has to be made between delayed marriage 
and non-marriage, and there is need to look at when people marry, not just, if they ever 
marry. Delayed marriage doesn’t mean non-marriage. It only means postponing marriage 
till much later. Therefore, as the cohorts grow older the rates of never married decline.  
 
Further, unlike Becker, who locates such shifts in marriage timing in the economic 
independence of women, Oppenheimer locates it in the deteriorating economic position 
of men (Oppenheimer 1994). Since young men’s transition to an adult role is signified by 
their ability to provide a certain standard of living, marriage can be delayed as they take 
more time acquiring this level of economic independence. This can happen especially 
when the economy is not favorable and wages are low. 
 
Recent research on marriage timing in Europe and America also finds that workforce 
participation increases the odds of marriage while school enrollment decreases it 
(Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Thornton et al. 1995; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Xie et al. 
2003; Copolla 2004). These studies however locate their explanation of these patterns in 
the life course framework (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Thornton et al. 1995; Xie et al. 
2003; Copolla 2004). The life course perspective was pioneered by Glen Elder and refers 
to the “age graded, socially embedded sequence of roles that connect the phases of life” 
(Mortimer and Shanahan 2003, pp xi), or “the social pathways of human lives” (Elder, 
Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003, pp 4). Essentially, the life course perspective examines how 
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the social context that people live in influences their lives, determines their life 
trajectories, and the choices they make throughout their life.  
 
This perspective has relevance for the study of marriage since marriage is a life event and 
its timing and occurrence is determined by other life events. With regard to marriage 
timing and its links with education and workforce participation, the life course 
perspective articulates that idea that these processes are linked because the decisions 
made with regard to one affect the decisions made with regard to the other processes 
(Copolla 2004).  
 
In 1991, Blossfeld and Huinink showed that in the former West Germany, women who 
were enrolled in school had low rates of entry into marriage. Their variable on current 
school enrollment was significant, while levels of education had no effect on marriage. 
The authors concluded that the delays were not occurring because women were 
increasing the time spent in acquiring human capital, but because they had postponed 
their transition from youth to adulthood. Since being in school was associated with 
economic dependence on parents, the women were still regarded as youths. Once they 
left school however, they transitioned to adulthood.  
 
Similarly research on the Netherlands and Flanders – the Dutch speaking part of Belgium 
(Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999), also shows that educational enrollment has a negative 
association with entry into a first union. This research also found that while 
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unemployment retarded men’s marriage chances, it helped women’s chances since the 
incompatibility between work and family roles was not there.  
 
Thornton et al.’s (1995) research on the United States also showed similar patterns for 
school enrollment. They measure school enrollment two ways: full time and part-time. 
Their results suggest that while both types of enrollment reduce the risk of entry into 
marriage for both men and women, full time enrollment reduced the risk even more. They 
too conclude that the increased risk of marriage when a person is enrolled part-time is 
probably because of the reduced time demands of part-time enrollment, which reduces 
incompatibility with marriage. Further, unlike Blossfeld and Huinink (1991) Thornton et 
al. found that in the United States, different levels of educational attainment also reduced 
the risk of marriage for men and women.  
 
More recent research on the United States by Xie et al. (2003) and on Italy and Spain by 
Copolla (2004) shows that when people are in school, their odds of marriage decrease 
considerably, while workforce participation increases the odds. Educational attainment 
levels had no association with odds of marriage in both studies. Further, the odds of 
marriage increase when earnings increase. Copolla explains this in two ways, both of 
which are linked to the life course perspective. She argues that education is incompatible 
with marriage since the ability to get married and start a family requires financial 
independence. Since being enrolled in school affects a person’s ability to earn and the 
fact that education often requires an economic investment, it leads to a postponement of 
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marriage. In contrast, exit from education and work force participation provides people 
with economic independence, and increases the odds of marriage (Copolla 2004).  
 
It has further been found that higher levels of income help increase men’s odds of 
marriage while they have a less important, or no association with women’s marriage odds 
(Copolla 2004; Xie et al. 2003; Oppenheimer 2003).  This supports Oppenheimer’s thesis 
that men’s economic position matters more for the occurrence of marriage than women’s.  
 
In contrast to this economic explanation for the incompatibility between marriage and 
education, Copolla’s second explanation is more normative and echoes the findings of 
Blossfeld and Huinink (1991). She states that when people are in school and they are 
getting an education, they are still viewed as being youths and therefore incapable of 
handling the adult responsibilities of marriage. In contrast, when people join the 
workforce, they are viewed as adults and therefore ready for marriage. Oppenheimer 
hints at this when she talks in terms of “young men’s transition to an adult economic 
role” which determines their ability to marry (Oppenheimer 1994, pp 322). In the 
developing country context, Malhotra and Tsui (1996) found this to be true for Sri Lanka 
as well.  
 
The various theories on marriage timing in industrial and less developed societies have 
relevance for this research as they provide plausible reasons for delays in marriage. 
Theoretically the process of modernization is supposed to foster increased individualism 
which in turn may mean that people value their autonomy more and want more in life 
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than just marriage and a family. In this case, delayed marriages may be an obvious 
outcome of the growing individualism and other value changes in Asia. As an extension 
of this, individuals may also want their marriages to be kept distinct from the pressures of 
the extended family norms and may be increasingly unwilling to marry only to satisfy the 
wishes of their extended families. They may give primacy to the conjugal bond and may 
choose to wait till they find a person who will provide them with an ideal family and 
married life. Increased economic independence brought about by improved levels of 
education and workforce participation enables these shifts to occur. 
 
The life course perspective could also provide insights into marriage timing in Indonesia. 
Since marriage is virtually universal in Asian societies, delays in marriage may be an 
outcome of delays in transition from a youth role to an adult role. This can be furthered 
by the process of industrialization since with the increased emphasis on education people 





The Indonesian context: 
 
Indonesia is in Southeast Asia and is the largest archipelago and the fourth most populous 
nation in the world. The 17,000 islands that make up Indonesia are divided into 27 
provinces for administrative purposes (CIA World Fact Book 2005). The capital city 
Jakarta is in the island of Java.  
 
----Table 3 about here---- 
----Figure 1 about here---- 
 
Today Indonesia is a democratic republic. It became a government of elected 
representatives after intense political turmoil in 1998, when protests against government 
inefficiency and high levels of corruption turned violent. This brought to an end four 
decades of authoritarian rule. However, corruption remains a major issue in Indonesia 
(CIA World Fact Book 2005).  
 
Indonesia also witnessed a major economic slump in 1997 (after the data used in this 
dissertation had been collected) because of the larger Asian economic crisis. The rising 
unemployment and poor economic prospects also added to the unrest in Indonesia, which 
eventually turned violent in the following year. Indonesia is now undergoing IMF 
mandated reforms in the banking sector to recover from the economic downturn. Before 
the economic slump, it was regarded as one of the Asian tiger economies. It witnessed 
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over three decades of economic growth and prosperity, and was on the brink of joining 
the middle-income countries. The size of its economy was comparable to that of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand combined. However, the Asian economic crisis 
slowed economic growth. However, there are wide variations across Indonesia with 
regard to how much the economic crisis affected each region, and how much economic 
development took place in the three decades of economic growth. As can be seen from 
figure 3, the province of Jakarta benefited disproportionately from the economic growth 
in Indonesia compared to the other provinces. 
 
----Figures 2 and 3 about here---- 
 
There is also variation between the provinces in the level of education and labor force 
participation rates. Additionally, these vary by sex and rural-urban residence. Over time 
there has been some fluctuation in the rates of enrollment and labor force participation. 
These are a reflection of the changes taking place in the economy. 
 
----Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 about here---- 
 
Indonesia is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an 
economic organization of Southeast Asian countries, which keeps the member nations as 
one common economic market. Almost ten years after the economic crisis, the 
Indonesian economy is financially stable, but still has problems of unemployment, a 
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fragile banking sector, and inadequate infrastructure. It is also less able to pull in foreign 
investment (CIA World Fact Book 2005).  
 
Indonesia is ethnically and religiously very diverse. There are about 300 different 
recognized ethnic groups in Indonesia. Of these, the major ethnic groups are the 
Javanese, the Sundanese, the Madurese, the Balinese, and the coastal Malays. The 
Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia and make up about 45% of the total 
Indonesian population (CIA World Fact Book 2005; Peacock 1973). They are the 
inhabitants of central Java and they are culturally the most influential ethnic group in 
Indonesia. The majority of the Indonesian population claims descent from the Malays, the 
original inhabitants of Malaysia. Historically, the Malays dispersed throughout Indonesia 
and split into smaller sub-groups with widely varying family structures and language. 
Because of the diversity in language, the government of Indonesia adopted Bahasa 
Indonesia as the country’s official language after independence from the Dutch in 1945. 
The native Indonesians are known as “bumiputras”, or “pribhumi”, or “asli”, terms 
derived from Sanskrit that literally mean “sons of the soil”, or “the true natives”. The 
“bumiputras” are distinguished from the non-native Indonesians like the Chinese and 
people of mixed Indonesian and Dutch parentage. 
 
Indonesia is a largely Muslim country. About 88% of the country’s population is Muslim, 
making it the largest Muslim population in the world. About 8% is Christian, and 2% is 
Hindu. The Hindu population is concentrated almost entirely in the island of Bali, where 




However, the nature and character of Islam in Indonesia is very different from the nature 
and character of Islam found in the Middle East (Geertz 1960; Peacock 1973; 
Koentjaraningrat 1975). Islam spread to Indonesia with the growth of trade and 
commerce with the Arab world in the Middle Ages (Peacock 1973; Koentjaraningrat 
1975). However, since Indonesia was a Hindu-Buddhist country before the spread of 
Islam, Islam in Indonesia retains many elements of its Hindu-Buddhist past. This 
manifests itself in the religious rites and rituals of the people (Peacock 1973; 
Koentjaraningrat 1975). While one group of the Javanese and the Sundanese, called the 
“Santris” are orthodox Muslims, the rites and rituals of rest of the community combine 
Islam with aspects of Hinduism and Buddhism.  
 
Indonesia also has a formal program that encourages internal migration. The Dutch 
originally started the program during the colonial period, and the government of 
independent Indonesia carried it on. The idea behind the transmigration program is to 
alleviate the population pressure on the islands of Java, Madura, and Bali by relocating 
the poor people from these islands to the outer islands of Indonesia. The island of Java 
alone has over 60% of Indonesia’s population, while accounting for only 6% of the total 
land area. Therefore, the transmigration program was designed to alleviate the population 
pressure on these islands. The outer islands to which people were relocated are Sumatra, 




Most of Indonesia has a nuclear family type. The conjugal unit is given primacy over the 
extended kin. The only exceptions are the Minangkabau, an ethnic group who originally 
lived in Sumatra, who have an extended family system.  
 
Descent is generally bilateral, that is, all individuals trace descent from both their mother 
and their father. The Balinese, the Toba Batak of Sumatra, and the Minangkabau are 
however an exception to this. The Balinese and the Toba Batak are both patrilineal and 
trace descent only from their father’s side. The Minangkabau are matrilineal and trace 
descent only from their mother’s side.  
 
While a couple is expected to set up their own home after marriage, in the event of a 
housing shortage, the couple can initially live with the wife’s natal family. The parents 
traditionally arrange marriages, and traditionally people are expected to marry within 
their own social class. Amongst the Balinese, the people are expected to marry within 
their own caste (Peacock 1973). Traditionally, the “santris” married within their own 
group since marriage outside the group was seen as a threat to the manner in which 
Islamic religious rituals and rites were conducted.  
 
Marriage is practically universal, and traditionally men and women married at very 
young ages (Malhotra 1997). The young age at marriage is more pronounced for women 
than men. Further, while men might have been given some choice in their spouse, 
women’s marriages were traditionally arranged almost entirely by the parents. This was 
because of a concern with parental status and their daughter’s virginity. Therefore, 
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marriages were timed around the attainment of puberty for women. Men married a little 
later – in their late teens or early twenties (Malhotra 1997).  
 
----Figure 8 about here---- 
 
Traditionally, Indonesia has also had high divorce rates. In the 1950s, the divorce rates in 
Islamic Southeast Asia were the highest in the world (Jones 1997). While Malaysia had 
the highest divorce rates, Indonesia had the next highest. Divorce rates were generally 
higher amongst lower socioeconomic groups than amongst the higher socioeconomic 
groups (Jones 1997). Peacock (1973) writes that amongst the poorer Indonesians, parents 
took it for granted that their daughter’s first marriage will end in divorce. Divorce is 
allowed under Islamic law. While the law allows both men and women to seek divorce, 
generally the men take the steps towards divorce. However, here too, Islamic Southeast 
Asia is different from the Middle East. Indonesian women have had recourse to divorce 
and have often sought it (Jones 1997). According to Jones (1997), the wives initiated a 
substantial number of divorce cases. Jones argues that there is a cultural predisposition in 
Islamic Southeast Asia towards divorce. A lot of emphasis is placed on compatibility of 
couples. If compatibility is found to be lacking in a marriage, then couples seek divorce. 
The ease of divorce under Islamic law only facilitates the process (Jones 1997).  
 
The Western countries overtook the divorce rates of Islamic Southeast Asia in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In the 1990s, the divorce rates in the West were about 4 times as high as the 
divorce rates in Indonesia (Jones 1997). Paradoxically, although one might expect 
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increased urbanization and industrialization to increase divorce rates, the divorce rates in 
Islamic Southeast Asia have been declining throughout the 60s and 70s (Jones 1997). 
Jones (1997) attributes this to the rising age at marriage for women, increased ability to 
choose your own spouse, and the expansion in education.  
 
Polygyny is also allowed under Islamic family law and there is some evidence of 
polygynous unions in Indonesia (Jones 1981, 1997). However, the rates of polygyny 
seem to be declining across Islamic Southeast Asia. According to Jones (1997), this is 
also one reason why divorce rates have declined in the region.  
 
The status of women in Indonesia is similar to the status of women in other countries in 
Southeast Asia, but higher than that of women in South Asia and the Middle East. 
Compared to the other regions in Asia, Indonesian women have property and inheritance 
rights, participate economically, and are active in public affairs. This is true also even 





Research question and hypotheses: 
 
Research question: 
Most South East Asian countries including Indonesia underwent structural adjustment 
programs in the early 1970s to encourage economic growth. The integration into the 
global economy increased the presence of the Western and Japanese private sector in the 
country which in turn reinforced middle class western values and lifestyles. These 
cultural changes were associated with social structural changes like increased levels of 
educational attainment and labor force participation especially for women but also for 
men (Malhotra 1997). Changes in the economic sphere of society have the potential to 
change the dynamics in other social domains. Marxian sociologists would call this the 
influence of the economic structure on the infrastructure of society. While we are not 
prioritizing among the different social domains as the Marxian sociologists do, we realize 
that major changes in one area of society can lead to changes elsewhere in society. In this 
specific case, we are interested in understanding how economic changes affect more 
traditional social systems like marriage and family formation. This is our research 
question. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter these associations were the subject of Malhotra’s 
(1997) research on marriage timing in Central Java, and Mensch et al’s. (2005) analysis 




Our research differs from Mensch et al’s. and Malhotra’s research in several critical 
ways. Mensch et al. do a macro level analysis comparing declines in the proportion of 
married persons in different regions of the developing world, especially the LAC 
countries and sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast our analysis is a micro-level analysis that 
specifically examines the case of Indonesia. Additionally, in their analysis, Mensch et al. 
are primarily interested in examining the association of marriage delays with education 
and urbanization. While urbanization is controlled for in our analysis, we focus more on 
education and work force participation since the research for the developed world 
identifies these variables as key to understanding changes in marriage timing.  
 
Another major difference between the Mensch et al. paper and our analysis is in our 
respective analysis strategies. As they recognize some of the difficulty in explaining the 
association between education and marriage delays could be due to their cross-sectional 
analysis strategy. They have compared married and unmarried women’s current 
characteristics (such as their current level of education) to see if these differences are 
associated with whether a person is currently married or not. We feel that this analysis is 
limiting. For example any cross-sectional relationship between marriage and more 
education might be explained by a causal effect of later marriages encouraging more 
schooling. We too include a cross-sectional analysis that compares the characteristics of 
married and unmarried persons at time 1, but in addition we include another model (we 
call this the dynamic model) that examines the determinants of marriage by tracking the 
unmarried persons over a four year time span. This gives us a truer picture of what kinds 
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of people were more likely to get married between time 1 and time 2. Our analysis is 
therefore longitudinal and prospective in nature and this helps avoid some of the 
problems faced by Mensch et al. in their analysis, especially the difficulty in 
understanding the causal processes underlying the association between education and 
delayed marriage.  
 
Similarly, our research differs from Malhotra’s analysis in several ways. Like Malhotra’s 
analysis, this analysis also examines the association of the societal level changes on 
marriage timing. Compared to her research that focused only on the province of Central 
Java, we are looking at most of Indonesia. Our data is also more recent compared to 
Malhotra’s (which was collected in 1982) and exists for two time points in the 1990s. Our 
methods of analysis are also different from hers. Since we have longitudinal data over 
two time points, we are able to look at determinants of marriage within a single cross-
section and also look at the determinants of change over time prospectively. In contrast 
Malhotra’s dataset though it was collected at a single point in time had life history data 
which allowed her to examine the research question retrospectively. One area of 
continuity between her analysis and ours is that we too want to keep the focus equally on 
men and women. Like her, we believe that the fertility literature’s exclusive focus on 
women with regard to marriage in developing countries is limiting since an understanding 
of how the process of family formation is affected requires an analysis of men’s marriage 




Our research differs from Malhotra’s in other critical ways. The purpose of her analysis 
was to examine if the process of industrial change and its concomitant social changes had 
resulted in egalitarian family formation processes for women as well as men in rural as 
well as urban areas. Specifically she asks if industrialization has led to increased spousal 
choice and less economic dependence on men for the women in Central Java. In contrast, 
we want to examine if the occurrence of the marriage event itself has been affected by the 
large scale economic changes. Our purpose in focusing on men and women equally is to 
get a comparative picture of the two significant players in the marriage process rather 
than to see if the changes benefit both equally. Our lack of focus on the latter is guided 
primarily by the fact that some benefits of delayed marriages like more stable marriages 
benefit both sexes, while others like increased women’s autonomy benefit women more 
(Hull 1987).  
 
Our analysis focuses primarily on whether increased levels of educational attainment and 
increased levels of labor force participation have resulted in changes in the timing of 
marriage for young Indonesians. Prior research (Kishor 1993; Murthi, Guio, Dreze 1995) 
shows that both education and labor force participation are powerful agents of change. 
They are simultaneously the causes and the consequence of the process of 
industrialization and modernization. Both have been documented as being correlated with 
processes as diverse as economic growth, social mobility, women’s empowerment, and 
increased political participation. In research on marriage timing in developing countries 




Research on Western countries also uses these variables but locates the results in a life 
course framework. The causal pathways by which the two variables are likely to be 
associated with marriage timing are described below. We provide the causal directions 
using both the modernization and the life course perspective. There are fewer pathways in 
the modernization framework for the hypotheses on men since the theory has traditionally 
been associated with women’s outcomes and almost never with men’s outcomes. We 
have used human capital theory and gender role theory instead to capture the effects of 
economic development for men (Malhotra 1997). The life course perspective in contrast 
provides pathways linking education and work to marriage, for both men and women.  
 
Primary independent variables: 
Education: In our analysis we measure education in two ways. First, we include a 
variable that measures whether the person is currently enrolled in school or not. Second, 
we include a variable that measures the highest level of education attained by a person. 
Two hypotheses guide our choice of variables: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Being enrolled in school will decrease the odds of marriage for both men 
and women. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of educational attainment will be associated with lowered 
odds of marriage for women but higher odds for men.  
 
The first hypothesis is tied to the life course perspective and we use school enrollment as 
a variable that will capture the effect of the life course (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; 
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Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Xie et al. 2003; Copolla 2004). According to the life course 
perspective, school enrollment influences marriage timing directly. Since attaining even 
basic education (at least high school) takes time and takes an individual well past the 
traditional age of marriage, a delay in marriage could occur simply by being in school 
longer. A life course perspective suggests that people in school or those who are still 
students may still be considered “children” or “minors” even if they are in their late teens 
or early twenties. People at this stage in their life may be regarded as being unprepared 
for taking on the challenges of raising a family. Studies on Sri Lanka (Malhotra and Tsui 
1996) and on Western societies (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Thornton et al. 1995; 
Copolla 2003) shows that this reasoning, that the youth role of a student is incompatible 
with the adult role of marriage, is widespread and is found in very different types of 
societies. By this logic, a person could delay their marriage by simply being in school 
longer.  
 
We use educational levels as our measure of modernization (Malhotra 1997). The link 
between modernization theory and delayed marriage for women has been articulated in 
prior research. Some education is considered useful or even necessary for women since 
education equips them with basic knowledge and skills to negotiate the world. This way 
education becomes a legitimate alternative to early marriage for women (Malhotra 1994).  
 
When education is prolonged women become more autonomous and empowered. They 
are more able to take decisions regarding their lives including when (and even to whom) 
they will get married (Murthi et al. 1995). Discussing the case of Malaysia, Gavin Jones 
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(1981) writes that women in Malaysia were traditionally not felt to know enough about 
the matter to make a wise choice. However, this attitude changed with the expansion of 
women’s education, and Malaysian women are now allowed the freedom of choosing 
their own spouse (Jones 1981).  
 
The marriage market too may force women to seek higher levels of education. As more 
men receive higher levels of education, they are likely to want educated wives. This in 
effect forces parents to educate their daughters more. This is also an economically 
rational decision for upwardly mobile families since better educated women attract men 
who have more education and consequently better income prospects. Sathar et al. (1988) 
also point out that the causal direction can work in the other way: in the event a suitable 
match cannot be found immediately, parents may continue educating their daughters till 
such a time they are able to find a match. 
 
For men, the link between education and marriage timing is guided by a combination of 
the human capital theory and gender role theory. Higher levels of education may affect 
men’s marital prospects positively. Higher levels of education will ensure that they get 
well paying jobs in an economy that is booming. A man who has a good education and is 
earning well becomes more marketable in the marriage market since men have the social 
role of the breadwinner. Therefore for men, more education attainment may be associated 




Aside from the more direct relationships between levels of educational attainment and 
marriage timing, there are also more subtle associations between the two variables. While 
we have no direct measure for values and norms in a society, it is possible that the course 
curriculum in modern industrial societies, which is virtually standard across the world, 
promotes western norms and values the longer a person is exposed to it (Caldwell 1980, 
Malhotra 1997). The adoption of western norms and values is one way by which 
education could lead to a delay in marriage. Since late marriage is a western norm, a 
delay in marriage in Asian countries could come about by making early marriage 
“unfashionable”. 
 
Societal level changes in marriage timing may be brought about by the increase in 
educated men and women in each province. In this case, it would not matter if an 
individual man or woman does not have a lot of education. If there are a large number of 
educated persons in the province, all of whom are postponing their marriage, then it may 
be everyone in that province will delay their marriage as well. Dharmalingam and 
Morgan (1996) found a similar process to be true with regard to women’s empowerment 
in South India. In villages where many women worked outside the home and through it 
gained autonomy and decision making powers, it did not matter whether an individual 
woman worked outside the home or not. Since her peers were autonomous, she also 
gained autonomy as a consequence of residing in that village. This leads to our third 




Hypothesis 3: As the proportion of educated men and women in the province increases, 
the odds of marriage for both men and women will decrease.  
 
Malhotra’s (1997) findings on Central Java show that the education and marriage timing 
relationship may not be as straightforward as these hypotheses suggest. As mentioned 
earlier, her research showed that increasing educational attainment might not have an 
impact on marriage timing since it sometimes reinforces traditional gender norms. It is 
therefore entirely possible that our analysis will produce results contrary to what we have 
hypothesized. 
 
Labor force participation: The relationship between men’s labor force participation and 
their marriage timing is easier to predict, and is captured by the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: As men’s labor force participation increases, their odds of marriage will 
increase. 
 
The reasoning behind our hypothesis is straightforward. It is guided by the logic of the 
marriage market and gender role theory. Men who are working are attractive marriage 
partners since they have financial resources to raise and provide for a family. As 
Liefbroer and Croijn (1999), Copolla (2003), and Xie et al. (2004) point out, economic 
circumstances are vital to family formation. Since men have traditionally had the role of 
the breadwinner in society, better paying jobs that result from an economic boom can 




Apart from the fact that raising a family is expensive, Indonesia also has a system where 
dowry3 is generally given by the groom to the bride (RAND IFLS newsletter). This 
would also make men who work and earn attractive marriage partners. The ability to pay 
dowry has been pointed out as being an important cause for declines in marriage by 
Mensch et al. (2005). 
 
From the perspective of the life course, men’s labor force participation may indicate 
economic independence from their parents and a marker of their entering adulthood. This 
too should increase their odds of marriage.  
 
A logical extension of our hypothesis for men would be that for men with higher levels of 
income, the odds of marriage are higher. This can be expected given that men who make 
more money would be even more attractive marriage partners compared to low earning 
men. We therefore frame our fifth hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5: High earning men will have higher odds of getting married compared to 
men with lower incomes. 
 
The relationship between work force participation and marriage timing is harder to 
predict for women. This is because there are several plausible associations between these 
two variables in the case of women. Using the modernization framework, one could 
                                                 
3 The practice of the groom giving gifts of money and kind to the bride’s family is called dowry in 
Indonesia, even though it is called bride-price in some other parts of the world. 
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argue that women in the labor force derive their economic security from work and no 
longer need to marry in order to be economically stable.  
 
Similarly, there may be an incompatibility between work and family roles. Lehrer and 
Nerlove (1986) have highlighted the incompatibility between women’s labor force 
participation and fertility along the dimensions of time use. Their argument can be 
extended to marriage timing. While marriage signifies the entry into family roles, labor 
force participation and also education are economic activities that are generally 
conducted outside the home, thereby reducing the time available for carrying out family 
roles. In this case marriage would decline. This is similar to Becker’s thesis on why 
marriage rates have declined in the West and is consistent with Cherlin’s (1992) findings 
on women and the family in the United States. Cherlin argues that a major reason why 
women are postponing marriage in the U.S is because they are no longer reliant on their 
husbands for financial security and stability. He argues that earlier there was an incentive 
for women to marry early since they derived their financial stability from their husbands. 
However, with the increased participation of women in the labor force, the need for 
women to marry to achieve financial stability has declined. While this hypothesis may 
predict non-marriage rather than its postponement for the United States, in the Asian 
context it is more likely to be associated with late marriage, since non-marriage is not an 
option for most Asian women.  
 
It is equally possible however that women’s labor force participation will increase their 
odds of marriage. This scenario was outlined by Oppenheimer (1994) who found that 
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women’s economic roles actually facilitated their family roles since it led to an expansion 
of their marriage markets. The life course perspective also hypothesizes a positive 
association between work force participation and women’s odds of getting married. Like 
in the case of men, the odds may increase because entry into the workforce signifies a 
woman’s entry into an adult economic role (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Copolla 2003). 
This argument may however be a little less likely in the Indonesian context since women 
don’t traditionally have the role of the economic provider in a family. Instead it may be 
possible that being out of the workforce helps women’s marriage odds as in the case of 
the Netherlands and Flanders (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999).  
 
A third possibility is that women’s labor force participation has no effect on marriage 
timing. This reasoning is the reverse of both the modernization and the life course 
theories. This can happen in cases where women’s labor force participation prior to 
marriage is a stop-gap arrangement till such a time that her parents are able to find a 
suitable match for her (Sathar et al 1988). In such cases work force participation is not an 
avenue for empowerment or autonomy and will probably be discontinued after marriage. 
Malhotra and Tsui (1996) found that employment for Sri Lankan women who did not 
value jobs or who did not look upon it as a source of income did not affect their marriage 
timing. Malhotra’s findings for Central Java show that marriage timing was not affected 
at all by women’s pre-marital work force participation. If this is true for Indonesia as a 




We favor the reasoning that labor force participation will not be significantly associated 
with women’s odds of marriage as this lack of association seems to be true for Asian 
countries. The negative and positive relationships between work force participation and 
marriage timing seem to be true for Western countries. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Increases in women’s labor force participation will not be associated with 
their odds of marriage. 
 
Control variables: 
In the following section we have outlined the relationship between marriage timing and 
other variables which are not our primary variables of interest, but which may confound 
the association between education and labor force participation with marriage timing. 
These variables may be associated directly with the marriage timing of an individual or 
they may affect their education and labor force participation and through them indirectly 
affect marriage timing. It is necessary to control for these variables and in the following 
section we have outlined some of the reasons. 
 
Socioeconomic status: We included a variable on socioeconomic status in order to 
separate out the effect of economic attractiveness of a person due to their earnings 
compared to their economic attractiveness because of their family’s socioeconomic 
status. A person’s family background could have a significant effect on their marriage 




For both men and women we would expect that if they came from wealthy families they 
would have higher odds of marriage. This can be, in part, a consequence of the dowry 
system. By and large men give dowries to their wives, except in the case of the Minang 
of West Sumatra where the bride gives dowry to the husband’s family (RAND IFLS 
newsletter). Wealthier families are able to give more dowries compared to poorer 
families and this would increase the odds of marriage for its members. Further, wealthier 
families may also have property or businesses that are inherited by each successive 
generation. The need to provide heirs could lead to higher odds of marriage for men and 
women from wealthy families.  
 
Urban Residence:  Urbanization is a correlate of the process of modernization. We will 
be using the urban dummy variable as a control variable. Urban areas are the arena for 
most industrial sector work and for higher levels of education. It is therefore necessary to 
control for place of residence in order to estimate the effect of labor force participation 
and education net of the place of residence.  
 
Additionally, being in a rural area may increase the odds of marriage for reasons of 
inheritance of land. Parents are more likely to exercise control over their children’s 
marriage when they control inter-generational transfers of land and other resources. 
These are less important in urban areas where employment in the modern sector of the 
economy is important. This may lead to a delay in marriage for urban men and women 




Malhotra (1991) findings for Central Java confirm that rural women were less likely to be 
able to choose their spouse since in rural areas wealth and farm background mattered, and 
this strengthened parental concerns of preservation and transmission of social status. 
Consequently, families preferred to retain their hold over deciding whom their daughter 
married. In contrast, in urban areas wealthy “white collar” (quotes in original) families 
allowed their daughters greater independence and decision-making capabilities in whom 
they married. This enabled urban middle class women to delay marriage. 
 
Family Structure: In Indonesia as in most Asian countries, family structure variables like 
birth order and co-residence with parents may determine the odds of marriage. Birth 
order matters in that older siblings are likely to be married first and younger siblings may 
have to wait until older siblings have married. Therefore a person’s odds of marriage are 
likely to be associated with whether they have older and younger siblings. Higher order 
birth children, that is, those children who have older siblings, will have lowered odds of 
marriage since they are lower in the queue for getting married.  
 
The relationship between co-residence with parents and marriage timing is difficult to 
predict for Indonesia because of its unusual post-marital residence patterns. Unlike most 
of Asia (and more like the West), Indonesia has neo-local residence, meaning that the 
bride and the groom set up their own establishment after they marry. In the event that 
they are unable to do so, the couple lives with either the wife’s family or the husband’s 
family depending on who can support them till such a time that they can set up their own 




This would mean that households would decide on the marriage timing of their unmarried 
members depending on whether they find them a drain on the household’s resources or an 
asset. A girl’s family may want her to marry since there is the additional incentive of 
getting dowry from the groom’s family. 
 
Co-residence with parents may reduce the odds of marriage for men since the money he 
earns from his job may be useful to the household and because paying dowry would 
increase a household’s financial burden.  
 
Age, religion and province: Our model also includes additional controls for age of the 
respondent, province of residence, and for the respondent’s religion. Controlling for age 
is necessary since odds of marriage peak at certain ages and decline gradually thereafter. 
Controlling for religion is also useful since different religious systems may have different 
prescriptions for marriage and family formation, which in turn may lead to differences in 
marriage timing. Province of residence is similarly useful since different provinces may 
have different levels of socioeconomic development and may be culturally different, 
which may lead to differences in marriage timing. We don’t have any specific measures 
for culture due to data limitations and region of residence is the closest approximation we 





Data and methods:  
Our analysis mainly utilizes the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data collected by 
RAND in collaboration with various organizations in Indonesia. IFLS is a longitudinal 
dataset that has been done in 3 waves. The first wave of the IFLS (IFLS1) was fielded in 
1993, the second (IFLS2) in 1997, and the third (IFLS3) in 2000. When the Indonesian 
economy collapsed during the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997, RAND carried out another 
shorter survey, called IFLS2+, on a 25% sub-sample of IFLS2 in order to measure the 
impact of the crisis on people’s lives. This survey was done in 1998. The available 
datasets therefore span the period before the economic and the political crisis, and the 
period during the crisis. Only the first two waves are analyzed in this dissertation 
(Frankenberg and Karoly 1995; Frankenberg and Thomas 2000). 
 
The IFLS sample covers thirteen out of twenty seven Indonesian provinces and is 
representative of 83% of the total Indonesian population. In the first wave the survey 
sampled 30,000 people from 7,224 households. The response rate was approximately 
93%. The provinces included in this study are: North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South 
Sumatra, Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogjakarta, East Java, Bali, 
West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi. Since the survey is 
longitudinal the second and third waves tracked the respondents from the first wave to 




In IFLS2, 94% of the IFLS1 households and 93% of the individual respondents (known 
as target respondents) were re-interviewed. In the second wave of the IFLS, 7600 
households were covered. This increase occurred because respondents who had split from 
their original household were followed.  
 
The IFLS1 survey has multiple components and the data in each component was 
collected with a different purpose. There is a household questionnaire that has detailed 
information on each member of a household including their current marital status, current 
income, education, and current work force participation. There is a child anthropometry 
module that has information on the health of two children in each household. A life 
history module contains detailed retrospective data on the education, workforce 
participation, migration, and fertility information for a sub-sample of working age people. 
The survey also has an aging questionnaire and a community questionnaire. 
 
For each component, information was obtained from different groups of people. The 
information on the household and its members was collected from the heads of the 
households and their spouses. Two children between the ages of 0-14 were sampled to 
get the child anthropometry information. One member over the age of 50 and their spouse 
were sampled to get information for the aging module. For a sub-sample of 25% of the 
households, one individual between the ages of 15-494 was sampled to get information 
for the life history module. The community questionnaire was completed by the 
community leader and the staff of schools and health facilities.  
                                                 
4 The IFLS documentation does not state whether they focuses specifically on any sex, so it can be assumed 




This dataset is well suited to this analysis since it has marital status, education, and work 
force participation information for 30,000 people. It also has basic background 
information on each respondent such as their age, province of residence, region of 
residence, and religion. 
 
This analysis depends mostly on the sample from the first wave of the IFLS data. 
However, the marital status information contained in the second wave of the IFLS data is 
also relevant to this analysis since it provides us with information on how the marital 
status of the IFLS1 respondents changed over time. The unit of analysis for both samples 
is the individual. We restricted this sample to respondents who were between the ages of 
12 and 30 at the time of the first survey.  
 
We are using a logit model for most of our analysis and we will use this model on two 
samples. The first sample comprises everyone 12 to 30 in IFLS1. Using a logit model we 
will compare the people who are married in IFLS1 with those who have never been 
married to understand the differences in the characteristics of these two groups. Our 
second sample is restricted to those who were never married in IFLS1, and we track this 
group of respondents to IFLS2 to see if they married in the intervening four years. Using 
a logit model, we then compare the characteristics of those who married to those who did 
not. In the analysis on the first sample, we will mainly examine the association between 
education and marriage. It is not possible to include work status in this model since we 
don’t have data on pre-marital work. In the analysis on the second sample we will look at 
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both work and education. Further, we do both sets of analyses separately on men and 
women. 
 
In analyzing the association between marriage and education, we are also including a 
multi-level analysis using hierarchical linear modeling. For this section we will use the 
1991 Indonesian Census data in addition to the IFLS data. The unit of analysis for the 
census data is the province and data exists for all twenty seven Indonesian provinces. We 
are, however, using the information for those 13 provinces that are a part of the IFLS 
sample. The census data includes counts of the number of people in each province who 
have an education. We will use this variable in our hierarchical analysis. 
 
Dependent variable:  
Marital status: The dependent variable was coded as a dummy variable where married 
respondents were coded as 1 and the never married 0. However the variable was slightly 
different depending on the sample on which the analysis was conducted. In the case of 
the first sample – our cross-sectional sample of only IFLS1 respondents, the marital 
status dummy was assigned the value of 1 if the respondent was ever married and 0 if 
they weren’t. The persons coded as 1 include those who are ever-married (this includes 
people who are currently married and those who are widowed, separated, or divorced). In 
the second sample, our dynamic sample, we need a measure that examines whether 
people who were never married during IFLS1 were ever married by IFLS2. Our dummy 
variable in this case is coded as zero in the event that they remained unmarried, while a 
value of one was assigned to those cases where the respondents married between the two 
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waves. This sample was further restricted by age to those between the ages of 12 and 30 
in IFLS1.  
 
Independent variables: 
Education: Our models include two sets of variables on education. In keeping with the 
theory that people who are still in school are less likely to marry, we have constructed a 
dummy variable where being in school is coded as 1 and everyone else is coded as zero. 
This variable is obtained from a categorical variable in the IFLS1 dataset that asks the 
respondent about their primary activity last week. Apart from “attending school”, the 
other choices were “working/earning income”, “job searching”, “housekeeping”, 
“retired”, and “other”. The zero on this variable includes everyone else.  
 
We also created multiple dummy variables for the highest level of education attained by 
the respondent. According to the codebook, a respondent can attain one of the following 
levels of education: no schooling, kindergarten, grade school (primary school), junior 
high general, junior high vocational, senior high general, senior high vocational, diploma, 
university, and other. Each level was coded a different dummy variable. In the model, the 
omitted category included everyone who was below primary, which includes the 
uneducated.  
 
Labor force participation: The variable for labor force participation is a dummy variable 
where the value of one is assigned to those who are working, while the value of zero is 
assigned to those who are not. The variable is coded out of a base variable that asks the 
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respondents whether they worked for a wage in the previous year or not. If they answered 
yes, then the respondents were assigned a value of one. They were assigned a zero if they 
said they did not. We did not use the same variable as for schooling since we also control 
for earnings in a subsequent model. Information on earnings is available only for those 
people who worked in the previous year. Therefore, we preferred to use the worked last 
year variable throughout our analysis. 
 
Control variables: 
Socioeconomic status: The household module in IFLS1 contains a set of questions on the 
household’s assets ownership. The question asks if a household has a phone, land, cattle, 
a vehicle, electrical appliances, savings and stocks, jewels, and gifts. It also asks about 
ownership of buildings and houses. Another question asks about the number of rooms in 
the household, whether the household has a ventilator, electricity, water supply, and a 
flush toilet, and about the floor, walls, and roof quality in the house.  
 
Of these items, ownership of vehicles, phones, electrical appliances, savings, gifts, 
jewels, buildings, plus households with ventilators, water supply, electricity, flush toilets, 
and good quality floors create a scale with a high Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient 
(0.699). We created an SES index by adding these items together (Bartholomew et al. 
2002).  
 
Earnings of respondent: An earnings variable was created out of a question that asks the 
monthly earnings of the respondent in the previous year. This variable was logged. This 
 
55
variable was normally distributed with a minimum value of 3.68 and a maximum value of 
20.55.  
 
Rural/ urban residence: The dataset contains basic information on rural urban residence 
of a respondent. We created a dummy variable where urban residence was coded as one 
and rural residence as zero.  
 
Sibling information: The dataset has information on the siblings for each respondent and 
their sex. We used this information to create separate dummy variables for whether the 
respondent has an older brother, an older sister, a younger brother, and a younger sister. 
 
Co-residence with parents: The dataset has information on the household head. If the 
head of the household was a parent of the respondent, then we assumed that the child was 
co-residing with their parents. We created a dummy variable where co-residence with 
parents was coded as one and the rest as zero.  
 
Age/religion/province: the dataset has information on the age of the respondent, the 
religion of the respondent, and on their province of residence. We created dummy 
variable for each religion (Islam, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians) and the 13 
provinces. Dummies for each two year age groups were created for the age of the 
respondent. In the final model, Islam was the omitted category for religion, while Jakarta 
was the omitted category for province. Islam is the majority religion, while Jakarta is the 






For our contextual hierarchical models, we divided the 13 provinces in Indonesia into 
their rural and urban components. Our aim in doing this was to minimize error due to 
differences in rural and urban areas, which would have biased our estimates had we used 
each province as a single macro level unit in the model. Our macro level units 
consequently increased to 25. Since the province of Jakarta does not have a rural area, it 
counted as one province.  
 
At the province level we mainly used a variable that measured the percent of men and 
women in the province who had post primary education. We aggregated all men and 
women who had above primary education and included it in our hierarchical model. This 
variable is continuous. There are on average 42.3% women and 50.1% men with above 
primary education in the 25 macro units.  
 
We created a rural dummy variable to enable us to control for those units which were 
rural. If a macro unit was rural, the dummy variable took the value of 1 and zero if it was 
urban.  
 
For our exploratory descriptive analyses we created several other variables, especially a 
variable to measure the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) in the province. We 
used the technique outlined by Hajnal (1953) and Shryock and Seigel (1976) to compute 
this statistic. An assets variable was also created. For rural areas we created this by 
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summing the proportion of households that used piped water for washing and drinking; 
that had a television, a motorcycle, and a septic toilet. For urban areas this variable was 
created by summing the proportion of households that a car, a radio, a sideboard, a 
cooking stove, a television, a multiple dwelling unit, that used gas for cooking, that had 
kerosene, electricity, a septic toilet, a private bath, and that used piped water for washing. 
The SMAM variable and the assets variable were not, however, used in the multivariate 
multi-level model.  
 
We also created a variable that measured the proportion of men and women in each 
province who were in the labor force. We used data on the total number of men and 
women above the age of 10 who were economically active in each province to create this 
variable. We did not however use this variable since there is no correlation between 





The base age pattern: 
 
The cross-sectional model: 
In the cross sectional model we examine which age group is most likely to be married in 
1993. The results for women show that the numbers of married women increase steadily 
with age   at ages 20-21, 32.43% of the IFLS1 women are married; at ages 28-30, 87.08% 
are married. Similar patterns can be observed for men as well. However, in each age 
group men are less likely to be married than women. At ages 20-21, only 13.68% are 
married and among the 28-30 year olds, 83.81%.   
 
----Table 1 and 4 about here---- 
----Figure 9 about here---- 
 
The dynamic model: 
Several models were analyzed that examine the odds of getting married by 1997 for men 
and women who were single in 1993. The base model including only the age dummies 
examines which age group was most likely to get married by 1997. The results indicate 
that the odds of marriage for women increase throughout the early years and peak at 
around age 24-25. It begins to decline gradually thereafter and decreases sharply at ages 
28 to 30. For men too the odds of marriage increase throughout the early years and peak 
at ages 26-27. It declines gradually for the 28-30 year olds but not by much. The results 
indicate that there is a difference by gender in the odds of marriage. Societal norms seem 
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to prefer a younger age at marriage for women and a slightly older age at marriage for 
men. This may have to do with societal ideals of having an older husband and a younger 
wife. In the analyses that follow we examine the extent to which people’s educational 
attainments, the province in which they live, and their work force participation affects 
their chances of marriage controlling for these basic age patterns.   
 
----Table 5 and 6 about here---- 





Results on education: 
 
Individual level cross-sectional models: 
The cross-sectional model examines the probability that men and women are already 
married in the first interview in 1993. The sample size for this analysis is 11,229 persons, 
who are all the persons in the IFLS sample between the ages of 12 and 30. The variables 
in this model take into account those current characteristics of a person that are likely to 
have been the same at the time of their marriage. For this reason, the variables used in 
this model are restricted to a person’s educational attainment, their religion, their current 
age (that proxies their birth cohort), and their province of residence. Variables such as 
work-force participation and their current school attendance are not utilized in this model. 
 
Educational attainment of women: More educational attainment is significantly 
associated with lowered odds of being married for women. Women with junior high 
general lower their odds of being married by –0.355 and women with senior high general 
reduce their odds of being married by a factor of –1.803, compared to women of the same 
age with primary education or less. Women who have been to college reduced their odds 
of marriage the most. Having a university degree is associated with a –2.813 reduction in 
the odds of marriage for women compared to those with primary or less education.  
 




Educational attainment of men: For men too, higher levels of education are associated 
with lower odds of marriage. The only exceptions are men with junior high vocational 
degrees. Their odds of marriage are not significantly different from men with primary 
education or less. Men with junior high general lower their odds of marriage by a factor 
of –0.291, and men with senior high general reduce their odds of being married by –0.845 
compared to men of the same age with primary education or below. Men with diplomas 
reduce their odds of marriage more than men with any other level of education. Their 
marriage odds reduce by a factor of -2.043.  
 
Age-education interaction model: Since there is no variable that measures the time 
elapsed between leaving school and getting married, we examine a model that interacts 
the respondent’s current age by their level of education. This will give us an idea of the 
relative odds of men and women’s marriage at different ages by their level of education. 
The results for both men and women show that the education-age interaction terms are 
not significant. Age and its quadratic term are however significant. This indicates that 
each year’s increase in the age of a person increases their odds of marriage. However, the 
rate of increase slows with increasing age. Their age pattern is independent of educational 
attainment. 
 
----Table 8 about here---- 
 
When we plot these values into a graph, we can see that women who have higher 
education are not only more likely to postpone their marriage, but they are also less likely 
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to have married by age 30. The slope of the curves for all levels of education is the same, 
but the curve for higher education (diploma and university) is to the right and reaches an 
asymptotic maximum somewhat lower.  
 
----Figure 11 about here---- 
 
For men the results are more complex. While more education delays marriage for men, 
higher levels of education results in somewhat less marriage for men at age 30. The latter 
statement needs to be qualified. For a given time spent in school, a slightly higher level of 
education increases men’s odds of marriage. For instance, although men who completed 
junior high general and those who completed junior high vocational spent approximately 
the same amount of time in school, the former are more likely to get married compared 
with the latter. Similarly, men with university education improve their odds of marriage 
compared to men who have diplomas. The curve for the junior high general is above that 
for primary and junior high vocational, while the curve for university education is above 
that for diploma. Further, the curve for university educated men hasn’t reached its 
asymptotic maximum by age 30. 
 
----Figure 12 about here---- 
 
Individual level dynamic models:  
While the cross-sectional analysis of the first wave of the IFLS data gives us a picture of 
what types of men and women are married, it doesn’t tell us much about the factors that 
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lead to these men and women getting married in the first place. In order to understand 
this, we need to analyze a model that follows single persons at time 1 to see which of 
them get married by time 2. We call this model the dynamic model. The dynamic model 
examines the probability of men and women getting married in the period between 1993 
and 1997 (the first and the second waves of IFLS). In this model, unlike the previous one, 
it is possible to include variables like school attendance, work force participation, and co-
residence with parents at the time of the first survey, in addition to basic background 
characteristics of individuals like their educational attainment and religion. Addition of 
variables that are likely to change over time helps us understand the differences between 
the people who married in the 4 years between 1993 and 1997 and those who did not. The 
sample size for this model is 6375 which is much smaller compared to the cross sectional 
model. The smaller size of the sample is due to the fact that many of the respondents in 
IFLS1 were married before the survey and therefore cannot be a part of this analysis. The 
sample for the dynamic model includes only those persons who were never married at the 
time of the first survey.  
 
School attendance for women: School attendance at the time of the first survey is 
significantly associated with lowered odds of marriage for both men and women. Even 
after controlling for age, if a woman is in school, she is less likely to get married in the 
next four years than a woman who is working or who is “at home”. Her odds of getting 
married are lowered by a factor of –1.253 compared to “at home” women. 
 




School attendance for men: As in the case of women, men who are in school also have 
lower probability of getting married; their odds are reduced by a smaller margin: men 
who are in school have –1.149 lower odds of getting married compared to “at home” 
men.  
 
Educational attainment for women: Unlike the cross-sectional model, higher levels of 
educational attainment are not significantly associated with a reduced probability of 
marriage for women. The only exceptions to this are women who have completed senior 
high vocational (10.3% of the sample) and university (3.95% of the sample). In both 
cases, their education level increases their odds of marriage compared to women with 
primary or less education.  The other coefficients are also positive but are not statistically 
significant.  So, in general, educational attainment levels are not especially important for 
the odds of getting married. It is more important whether you are in school or not, but not 
what level of school you are in.  
 
Educational attainment for men: For men, completing junior high general is significantly 
associated with a lower probability of getting married than completing only primary 
education or less. Men with junior high general reduce their odds of marriage by a factor 
of –0.339 compared to equivalent men who have primary education or less. This 
coefficient is smaller than the in school coefficient; so for men too levels of educational 
attainment matter less than whether you are in school or not. 
 
No other educational category has a significant association with the odds of marriage for 




Age-education interaction: Although educational attainment has no simple main effect on 
marriage probabilities perhaps higher education has differential effects depending on age. 
If higher educational attainment is associated with later marriage it might decrease the 
probability of marriage among the young and increase the probability of marriage among 
the old.  The age-education level interaction model tells us how likely men and women 
are to delay marriage depending on how much education they receive5. The interaction 
effects may also tell us something about the importance of time since leaving school.  
 
In the model with the age and education level interaction for the women the interaction 
terms are not significant but age and its quadratic term are. Since the linear and quadratic 
age terms are significant, we conclude that each year’s increase in a woman’s age 
increases their odds of marriage. However since neither the education terms nor the 
interaction terms are significant, the results imply that education has no additional effect 
on the odds of marriage above what a persons’ age has. This means that the age effects 
are basically the same for each level of education, and the lack of education effects are 
the same for the young and the old. That is, being 30 doesn’t change the odds of marriage 
for a primary school woman compared to a university graduate woman, even despite the 
fact the former has been out of school longer. This suggests that time since leaving school 
is not an important aspect of marriage chances.  
 
----Table 10 about here---- 
                                                 
5 In a subsequent model we analyzed the interaction between school enrollment and education level. This 
tells us whether it is the education level that is associated with the odds of marriage, or if it is the fact of 




 For the men, some interaction terms are significant specifically those for senior high 
general and senior high vocational. For these two educational categories, there is an 
additive effect of education over and above that for age. Age and its quadratic term are 
significant for men too and the interpretation is the same as that for women: each years 
increase in a man’s age, increases his odds of marriage.   
 
Because the interaction effects necessarily involve a quadratic in age, we plotted the 
coefficients from our interaction model in a graph to get a clearer picture of their 
association with the odds of marriage. On plotting the values in a graph, we can see that 
for both men and women, different education levels reach a peak marriage rate at slightly 
different times. After the peak has been reached, the odds of marriage begin to decline for 
the men and women. People with primary education reach a peak marriage rate at 
somewhat earlier ages, while people with university degrees reach a peak marriage rate at 
later ages. The marriage rates begin to peak for women between the ages of 18 and 25 
and taper off subsequently, though the rates for university educated women has not 
reached its asymptotic maximum.  The different peaks represent the (additive) effects of 
educational levels – effects that are not statistically significant.  For women, the curves 
have a similar shape which reflects the lack of any significant interaction between age 
and education in marriage chances. 
 




For men, the age-education interaction curves are more dramatically different for the 
different levels of education indicating significant interaction terms. Some of these 
curves, like the one for diploma holders, need to be interpreted with caution since they 
indicate high rates of marriage at younger ages. This may be due to low cell frequencies 
for young people with a diploma.  But the diploma curve for higher ages resembles the 
shape of secondary school curves.  For these groups, there is little evidence of declining 
marriageability at older ages.  Educated Indonesian men seem to pay no penalty for 
delaying marriage:  their marriage rates only increase with age.  However, university 
graduates fit the more usual bell shape curve, but there are only 4 % (168 men) of them in 
the sample so our estimates may be less reliable for them   
 
----Figure 14 about here---- 
 
Education and current school enrollment: In order to understand the relative effects of 
education levels and school enrollment, we examine a model that interacts currently 
enrolled in school and education level. Although educational level showed no strong 
effects in Table 8, that sample included men and women still in school for whom 
educational attainment is not yet complete. Perhaps more education affects the marriage 
chances of only those who have completed their schooling. The results are presented in 
Table 10 and Figures 7 and 8. No interaction terms are significant for men, while the 
interaction terms for junior high general and university are significant for women. On 
plotting the values into a graph, we can see that for both men and women, it is the fact of 
being currently enrolled in school that keeps people away from marriage more than the 
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level of education. The bars for the currently enrolled in school are associated with lower 
levels of marriage regardless of education level.  The interaction effect for female junior 
high and university students reflects the fact that being in school has an especially 
negative effect on marriage chances for these women.  Junior high and graduate women 
who have finished school have the best marriage chances of all women while junior high 
and graduate women still in school have the worst chances of all women.  Overall 
however, the differences among educational levels are small and not systematic for either 
women who had finished school in wave 1 or those still in school. The differences among 
educational levels for men (Figure 8) are similarly small and unpatterned.  
 
----Table 11 about here---- 
----Figures 15 and 16 about here---- 
 
Comparisons of individual level cross-section and dynamic models:  
Our results on education so far show that in the 1993 cross-sectional model there is late 
and less marriage for both men and women with higher levels of education. The dynamic 
model indicates that the late marriage is due to school enrollment. The dynamic model 
also shows in addition that higher education for men and women are not associated with 
marriage rates in any systematic pattern.  
 
So, on the one hand, there are the differences in the results, but on the other hand, the 
results from the cross-section seem to indirectly support the results from the dynamic 
model. One reason why higher levels of education may reduce the odds of being married 
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in 1993 is because the more educated have stayed in school longer. But, once their school 
attendance is controlled for, the levels of education don’t seem to matter for the 
subsequent probability of getting married. By this interpretation the cross-section results 
show education effects mainly because the highly educated spend more years in school 
and out of the marriage market.  But, once they have finished school, well educated 
women have neither better nor worse chances for getting married than less educated 
women. Their later ages at marriage reflect only their longer time in school.  
 
Further, since the dynamic model also controls for age at the time of survey, we have 
three sets of variables in the model that are a linear combination of each other: current 
school enrollment, level of schooling, and age at time of survey. Indirectly, this means 
that level of schooling measures the time since leaving school. Since in the dynamic 
model, the education level variables are not significant, it suggests that the time since 
leaving school does not explain the odds of marriage for either men or women in 
Indonesia.  The lack of significant interaction effects between age and education level 
also supports this interpretation for women.  
 
Another possible interpretation of the results of the dynamic model is that there may be a 
selection effect in the 1993 sample of single men and women. Since the more 
marriageable of the less educated people would have already married prior to the first 
survey, the sample we have for the dynamic model may include the less marriageable of 
the less educated and all of the better educated persons. We are therefore left with a 
sample of persons all of whom have postponed their marriage for one reason or the other, 
and whose lower “marriagability” may offset or counterbalance the effects of education 
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on marriage. It is however difficult to control for this phenomenon in our analysis since 
our data do not provide us with the variables that could help us measure 
“marriageability”. Mensch et al. (2005) also encountered this problem in their analysis.  
 
Contextual models: 
In addition to running logit models, we also ran several two level hierarchical models. 
The logit models that regressed the odds of marriage on province level education showed 
that higher proportions of educated men and women in the province would reduce the 
odds of marriage for each respondent in IFLS (models not shown). However, it is 
necessary to examine this in a hierarchical framework since a logit model cannot control 
for the problem of lack of independence of units that occurs in such a situation. The 
hierarchical models incorporate the province level education data from the 1991 
Indonesian Census. Hierarchical models help us understand whether marriage chances 
are largely due to the variations in the characteristics of the individuals (compositional 
factors), or if they are also a function of the area where they reside (contextual factors), 
such as the educational or developmental levels of the areas. If province characteristics 
play a role in the odds of a person’s marriage, it is likely that even less educated people in 
a province with an overall high level of education will marry late, while well educated 
people in a province with an overall low level of education will marry early. This helps 
us identify whether marriage chances are because of individual characteristics alone, or if 




Since rural areas within a province are likely to be different from the urban areas, we 
divided each province into rural and urban areas and treated them as different macro level 
units. Consequently, instead of 13 provinces, we have 25 macro level units in our model6.  
 
Descriptive statistics from the 1991 Indonesian census data show a fair amount of 
variation across the provinces in the average age at marriage and in the percent of people 
who are currently married. The singulate mean age at marriage for women ranges from 
19 years (in rural west Java) to 25 years (in urban south Sulawesi) for women and 
between 23 years (in rural west Java) to 29 years (in urban Yogjakarta) for men. 
Similarly, the percent of women ages 10-35, who are married varies from 36% (in urban 
south Sulawesi) to 59% (in rural east and west Java), while the percent of men ages 10-
35, who are married varies from 29% (in urban south Sulawesi) to 45% (in rural west 
Java).  
 
----Table 12 about here---- 
----Figures 17 and 18 about here---- 
 
Similarly, there is a lot of variation across provinces in education levels. While rural East 
Java has the lowest proportion of women receiving above primary education (27%), 
urban west Sumatra has the highest percentage of women receiving above primary 
education (approximately 62%). Rural east Java also has the lowest percentage of men 
receiving above primary education (33%), while urban west Sumatra has the highest 
percentage of men receiving above primary school education (66%). Since education 
                                                 
6 The province of Jakarta does not have a rural area and counts as only one macro level unit 
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levels are consistently higher in urban areas this close association will make it difficult to 
jointly estimate the effects of urban and education.  
 
Marriage, whether measured by the average age at marriage or by the percent of persons 
who are currently married, is strongly correlated with provincial education but is weakly 
correlated with labor force participation. As more women are educated above the primary 
level, the average age at marriage in the province also increases. There is a positive 
correlation of 0.83 between the average age at marriage for women and their being 
educated above primary school level. This is true for the men as well. There is a positive 
correlation of 0.88 between the average age at marriage for men and the percent of men 
who have received an education above the primary level.  
 
In contrast, women’s labor force participation has a weak but negative correlation with 
the singulate mean age at marriage (r = -0.27). This pattern is negative and somewhat 
stronger for men (r = -0.50).  
 
Cross-sectional hierarchical models:  
We examine four different sets of two level hierarchical models: a cross-sectional and a 
dynamic model each for women and men separately. The cross-sectional model utilizes 
the 1993 IFLS data at the individual level and the 1991 Indonesian Census Province data 
at the macro level. The dependent variable in the cross-sectional model is whether the 
respondent was married in 1993 or not. The dynamic model utilizes the 1993 and 1997 
IFLS data at the individual level and the 1991 census data at the province level. 
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Consequently, the dependent variable in the dynamic models is whether the respondent 
got married between 1993 and 1997.  
 
Two different models were analyzed using the cross-sectional data. In a reduced model, 
we include at the individual level only the basic controls like age categories and the 
religion of the respondents. At level 2, we include education and a rural-urban dummy. 
The education variable measures the percentage of men and women who have received 
above primary education. The rural-urban dummy measures the influence of being in a 
rural versus urban area on the odds that a person will be married in 1993. 
 In a second step we also ran a model that added education attainment at level 1 in 
addition to the other controls to see how much of the regional educational difference can 
be explained by individual level education.  
 
Model without individual education controls: Like the provincial census data, the cross-
sectional IFLS results show that women’s odds of being married in 1993 is inversely 
correlated with the proportion of educated women in the province. As the proportion of 
women with above primary school education increases, women in the province reduce 
their odds of being married by a factor of -0.048. A similar pattern can be seen for the 
men as well. For each percentage point increase in the proportion of educated men, men’s 
odds of being married declined by a factor of –0.043.  
 




Differences in marriage odds between rural and urban areas are entirely explained by 
these educational differences. Marriage odds are not affected by urbanization once 
education is held constant. 
 
Model with individual education controls: Some of this provincial relationship is due to 
the individual effects of more education on reduced marriage odds. In the second cross-
sectional model (the full model), we add the respondent’s own educational attainment at 
level one, in addition to the basic controls included in the first model. In this model too 
we find that the province level effects of education exist even after controlling for an 
individual’s personal educational attainment. Thus, men and women of the same 
educational attainment, who live in a province with a high proportion of educated people, 
reduce their odds of marriage by a factor of -0.046. For men, this represents a slight 
increase (7% increase) in the magnitude of the coefficient; while for women it represents 
a slight decrease (4% decrease). But this difference is negligible.  
 
----Tables 14 and 15 model 2 about here ---- 
 
In addition, a person’s individual educational attainment remains important. For women, 
all educational categories reduce their odds of marriage relative to women with primary 
education or less. For men, all education categories except junior high vocational reduce 
their odds of marriage relative to men who have primary education or less. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is however reduced in the hierarchical model compared to 




The analysis for the 1993 cross-sectional data therefore shows that there is both a 
contextual and a compositional effect of education on the odds of marriage for 
Indonesian men and women in 1993. The odds of being married are affected not only by 
a person’s own education, but also by the education of others around them. 
 
Dynamic hierarchical models:   
The dynamic models examine the relative contribution of individual characteristics and 
province characteristics on the odds of a single person getting married between 1993 and 
1997.  
 
Collinearity of provincial education and urbanism: In the dynamic hierarchical model we 
were not able to jointly estimate the effects of provincial education and urbanism. In a 
reduced model for men (not reported here), where rural residence and province and 
province education were included, the results showed that neither variable has a 
significant effect on the odds of men’s marriage between 1993 and 1997. Even in the full 
model where individual controls for a respondent’s education, their work status, and their 
current school attendance were introduced, provincial factors were not associated with 
the odds of men’s marriage.  
 
However, in a model where province education alone was included (without individual 
controls), the magnitude of the coefficient for provincial education was not much 
different from the model where rural residence was included, although the coefficient in 
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the latter model was not significant while the coefficient in the former was. An 
examination of the associated standard errors shows that the error associated with 
province education in the model where both variables are included, is approximately 2.5 
times the size of the error in the model where only education is included. This indicates 
that the dummy for rural residence and provincial education may be collinear. An 
examination of figure 10 shows us why this is a problem. Since the regions with low 
education and low age at marriage are rural areas, and regions with high education and 
high age at marriage are urban areas, there isn’t enough variation in the rural dummy 
variable to indicate whether the provincial effects on age at marriage are due to the 
overall level of education or because of the region being rural. Therefore the only models 
reported here are the ones where the rural dummy variable and the province education 
were included separately in the model. 
 
Model with no individual level controls: Our initial HLM models suggest that without 
controls for men’s own education, higher levels of provincial education reduce the odds 
of men’s marriage by a factor of –0.017.   Living in a highly educated area reduces the 
chances that men will get married in the next four years. Similarly, living in an urban area 
reduces the chances of marriage. 
 
Model with individual level controls: Once a man’s own characteristics are controlled 
for, the effect of province level education reduces and is no longer statistically 
significant. The results at level 1 in the full model mirror the results for men in the logit 
models. This indicates that the odds of marriage for single men between 1993 and 1997 
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are not dependent either on individual educational attainment or on the proportion of men 
in the province who have completed post primary education, but on whether the men are 
enrolled in school or not.  The effect of higher provincial levels of education appears to 
be mediated through this school retention effect.  In provinces with high levels of 
education, more men remain in school and this lowers the chances of marriage over the 
next four years. 
 
----Table 16 about here---- 
 
The dynamic models for women show that in the models where only province education 
is included at level 2 (regardless of whether this is the reduced or the full model), the 
coefficients for education are significant. We could therefore interpret these results as 
meaning that a percentage point increase in the proportion of women with post primary 
education at the province level reduces the odds of marriage for single women in the 
province by a factor of -0.025. This is smaller than in the model without individual 
controls (-0.033) so some of the association with provincial education is because in better 
educated provinces more women remain in school and this lowers their chances of 
marriage over the next few years. But as with cross-sectional results, a significant 
contextual education effect remains. When a girl stays in school longer that not only 
lowers her own chances of early marriage, it has a spillover effect on other women in the 
area who are also less likely to marry early probably because of the changes in the 




----Table 17 about here---- 
 
The results at level one in the model where a respondent’s own characteristics are 
controlled for mirror the results in the logit model. Therefore, as in the case of men, a 
woman’s own education matters less for her chances of getting married, than being in 
school does. However being in a province with a high proportion of educated women 
continues to have a depressing effect on women’s odds of marriage.  
 
Conclusions from the logit and hierarchical models:   
The picture that emerges by examining the micro level logit models and the hierarchical 
models that situate the individual level results in the context of what is happening in the 
province, is that compared to the level of education of an individual, it is the fact of being 
enrolled in school that makes the most difference to a person’s odds of becoming 
married. Levels of education are relatively unimportant compared to current enrollment 
status. More educated men and women do marry later but only because they have spent 
more time in school – time that lowers their chances of marrying over the next few years. 
 
For women, the proportion of women in the province with post primary education matters 
as well, while for men it is only school enrollment that matters. Therefore delays in 
marriage for both men and women are partly a result of being enrolled in school. For 
women alone, having more women in the province with post primary education also 





Results on workforce participation: 
 
Since we are examining the association of economic development on traditional 
institutions like marriage, the next logical step at the micro level is to examine the 
relationship between the odds of marriage and three types of individual labor force 
activity and wealth that are associated with periods of vigorous economic growth: 1. 
workforce participation, 2. earnings and wage rates, 3. household wealth.  
 
In this chapter we will first examine the basic association between marriage odds and 
work force participation. Since research on the U.S., Italy, and Spain show that different 
levels of income are associated with different marriage odds, we refine the relationship 
further to see if differences in income contribute to differentials in marriage odds in 
Indonesia. Finally, we examine if differences in household socioeconomic status leads to 
differentials in marriage odds. 
 
Research on the United States by Cherlin (1980, cited in Oppenheimer 1994), 
Goldschieder and Waite (1986, cited in Oppenheimer 1994), Lichter et al. (1992, cited in 
Oppenheimer 1994), Oppenheimer (1994), and Xie et al (2003) shows that people’s 
economic independence increases their odds of marriage. This finding is corroborated by 
Copolla’s research on Spain and Italy. Copolla argues that since union formation is a 




About 62% of the total sample of 32900 persons (includes all ages) in IFLS 1 stated that 
they had worked in the previous year, while about 40% stated that they had worked in the 
previous week. In the reduced sample of 7425 single men and women ages 12 to 30, that 
was used in the dynamic model, the percentage of persons who worked in the previous 
year and the percentage of those who worked in the previous week is almost identical at 
approximately 30%. Further, in the reduced sample 26% of the women indicated that 
they had worked last year and an equal number said they had worked last week. In 
contrast 33% of the men had worked last year and an equal number had also worked last 
week.  
 
At the province level, labor force participation rates for both men and women above age 
10 vary across Indonesia. Both rural and urban south Sulawesi has the lowest women’s 
labor force participation (approximately 18%), while rural Yogjakarta has the highest 
percentage of women in the labor force (54%). Urban south Sulawesi also has the lowest 
percentage of men in the labor force. About 43% of its men are in the labor force. Rural 
Yogjakarta has the highest proportion of men in the labor force (63%). An examination 
of the graph on the province level relationship between labor force participation of men 
and women and marriage shows however, that there is little correlation between the two 
variables. 
 
----Table 13 about here---- 




The basic results on work:  
Basic bivariate cross-tabulations of the number of people who got married between 
waves one and two and those were in the labor force shows that 53.5% of those who got 
married between 1993 and 1997 were also those who had been working. In contrast only 
17% of those who had been enrolled in school got married between waves one and two. 
This indicates that being in school is incompatible with marriage while labor force 
participation may facilitates it.  
 
This hypothesis is borne out by our multivariate analysis. As in the case of education, the 
basic results on workforce participation are obtained from a model that includes all the 
variables in the analysis. Unlike, education which had a negative association with the 
odds of marriage, the results on workforce participation indicate that for both men and 
women, all else being equal, working (versus neither working nor being enrolled in 
school) increases the chances of marriage. Women improve their odds of marriage by a 
factor of 0.362, while men increase their chances by a factor of 0.5717. While this effect 
is not as strong as the negative association of school enrollment on marriage, it clearly 
highlights the compatibility between work and marriage and the incompatibility between 
school enrollment and marriage. 
 
                                                 
7 This model used the “worked last year” variable. In a similar model that used the worked last week 
variable, the odds for women increased by a factor of 0.216 while that for men increased by a factor of 
0.562, which is more than twice the odds for women. 
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It appears from these results that in a society where marriage is universal, working makes 
a person a better prospect on the marriage market. This could be for several reasons: 1. 
Work force participation is an event in the life course that shows readiness to enter 
married life. 2. Work force participation makes a person economically attractive as a 
marriage partner. 3. There is a selection effect. That is, people who are more successful in 
their work are also successful in attracting marriage partners.  
 
If selection or economic attractiveness explains better marriage prospects, then if we 
looked at the levels of economic success we should find better marriage odds at each 
higher level. For example, higher wages from work or a family’s higher socioeconomic 
status should increase a person’s marriage chances even more. Therefore as a next step 
we analyzed two models that examined the association of a person’s wages from work on 
their marriage prospects, and another that examined the association of a family’s 
socioeconomic status on the marriage prospects for its unmarried members.  
 
----Table 9 about here---- 
 
Results on earnings:  
A logged earnings variable was created out of a question that asks respondents about their 
monthly income for the work they did in the previous year. Logged earnings was 
included in the basic model in order to determine the association between income and 
odds of marriage. This model was restricted to only those men and women who worked 
last year since our hypothesis states that it is the differentials in their pay that will lead to 
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a difference in their marriage prospects. However, this is not the case. The log of the 
earnings variable is not significant for either men or women8 in predicting subsequent 
marriage prospects.  
 
Therefore what appears to matter for marriage prospects is simply whether you are 
working or not, not how successful you are at work – at least as indexed by earnings 
level. So, these results suggest more of a life course model than an economic success 
model to explain marriage rates. It would appear that joining the labor force is a life 
course event that serves as a social marker of a person’s ability to enter into married life. 
A life course perspective to marriage timing would also explain why being in school 
keeps both men and women from marriage. While explaining marriage patterns in Sri 
Lanka, Malhotra and Tsui (1996) suggest that when people are in school – regardless of 
their actual ages, they are still viewed as being children rather than as adults. Similarly 
Copolla (2004) writes that in Italy and Spain, being enrolled in school is viewed as being 
incompatible with the more adult role of being married. People in school are not viewed 
as being ready to take on the responsibilities of adult life, like marriage, and education 
typically reduces marriage odds. In contrast, in Italy, Spain, and the United States, being 
in the workforce is associated with higher odds of marriage since working and earning 
signifies readiness to take on familial responsibilities. A similar trend seems to be 
apparent for Indonesia as well.  
 
----Table 18 about here---- 
                                                 
8 A separate model (not shown here) was analyzed which omitted the different education variables (to 
remove any potential collinearity problems) to check if the logged earnings variable is significant. 




The results on household wealth:  
Next, we analyzed models that examine the effects of household wealth (a composite 
measure of a household’s asset ownership) on people’s chances of marriage. Wealthier 
households could improve their children’s marriage prospects because they make more 
economically attractive partners. On the other hand household wealth is also associated 
with several factors that inhibit marriage odds: 1. co-residence with parents, 2. the 
number of siblings in the household, and 3. education.  
 
In the first model we examine the association of household socioeconomic status on the 
odds of marriage without the mediating influence of family structure variables, workforce 
participation, and education (school enrollment and level of education). Family structure 
may be related to the household wealth index since the number of people in a household 
can affect the distribution of resources. Similarly, both work force participation and 
education being human capital measures can also influence the total household resources. 
Excluding them from the model will provide us with a clearer picture of how household 
wealth is associated with the odds of marriage. 
 
 As can be seen from table 18, household socioeconomic status has a negative and 
significant relationship with the odds of marriage. It reduces the odds of marriage by a 
factor of 0.066 for women and 0.077 for men. This implies that a shift in the family’s 
status from the 10th to the 90th percentile will reduce the odds of marriage for women by a 




In the next model we included the family structure variables but continued to exclude 
workforce participation and education. In this model too household socioeconomic status 
has a negative and significant relationship with marriage odds. It reduces women’s odds 
of marriage by a factor of about 0.061 and men’s odds of marriage by a factor of 0.068. 
This is only a marginal reduction compared to the previous model and here too a shift in 
the family’s status from the 10th to the 90th percentile reduces the odds of marriage for its 
unmarried women by a factor of 0.366 and for men by a factor of 0.408. 
 
In the final step we included both education and work force participation (this is the same 
as the basic model, Table 9, in our analysis). In this model the coefficient associated with 
family socioeconomic status is not significant. This suggests that much of the effect of 
family SES operates on marriage chances through their continued school enrollment. 
Children from better off households are more likely to stay in school and therefore less 
likely to marry. But once these educational consequences are held constant, then 
household wealth neither helps nor hinders. Men and women from wealthy households 
may be more economically attractive but that does not give them any advantage in getting 
married earlier. 
 
----Table 19 about here---- 
 
The consequences of economic factors on marriage are mixed. On one hand economic 
development leads to more jobs and through it more marriage. On the on the other hand, 
 
86
it increases household wealth, which then leads to more time spent in school and 
consequently less marriage. There is however little evidence that wealth per se has much 





Results on control variables:  
Cross-sectional model: 
Our results on the other control variables are not unusual. Not surprisingly, urban 
residence has a negative association with the odds of marriage for both men and women. 
Being in an urban area reduces the odds of marriage for women by a factor of -0.792 in 
1993, while for men it reduces the odds of marriage by a factor of -0.518.  
 
----Table 7 about here---- 
 
Religion has no particular association with odds of marriage unless the person is 
Christian. Christian women reduce their odds of marriage by a factor of -0.519 while 
Christian men reduce their odds of marriage by a factor of -0.861.  
 
Living in Lampung, West Java, Central Java, East Java, and South Kalimantan increases 
a woman’s odds of marriage. For men, living in West Java, East Java, West Nusa 
Tengarra, South Kalimantan, and Sulawesi increases the odds of marriage, while living in 





The results for the control variables on the dynamic model are different from the results 
in the cross-sectional model. The urban variable is not significant for men. It appears that 
the other controls have explained the effects of urban residence for men. However, for 
women residence in an urban area reduces the odds of marriage between 1993 and 1997 
by a factor of -0.465.  
 
----Table 9 about here---- 
 
Being Christian continues to have a negative association with the odds of marriage for 
both men and women. Being Christian reduced the odds of marrying between 1993 and 
1997 by a factor of -0.577 for women and a factor of -0.462 for men.  
 
For women, having older brothers and older sisters has a depressing effect on their odds 
of marriage. Women with older brothers reduce their odds of marriage by a factor of -
0.180, while women with older sisters reduce their odds of marriage by a factor of – 
0.193. It appears therefore that for women the queuing effect of marriage is quite strong. 
For men, having older sisters reduces the odds of marriage by a factor of -0.539, while 
having younger brothers increases their odds of marriage by a factor of 0.069. This 




Additionally, for men, co-residence with parents reduced their odds of marriage between 
1993 and 1997 by a factor of -0.263. For women this variable had no significant 
association with their odds of marriage. 
 
Unlike the cross-sectional model, residence in certain provinces is associated with 
negative odds of marriage for women. Living in North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Central 
Java, Yogjakarta, Bali, and Sulawesi reduced the odds of women’s marriage between 
1993 and 1997. For men in comparison, residence in South Sumatra, Lampung, West 






The average age at marriage has been thought not to change very easily since it is 
grounded in the normative structure of a culture. In Asia however age at marriage is 
increasing rapidly. In this dissertation we proposed to examine the determinants behind 
this change. We specifically examined the case of Indonesia using two waves of the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey data. The aim of our analysis was to examine the 
influence of two key correlates of industrialization – education and labor force 
participation to see how they influence marriage timing. Both variables have been 
associated with increased empowerment and increased economic independence. This is 
particularly important for women since traditionally marriage has been a means of 
acquiring economic stability for women. For men too these two variables are important 
since they are linked to acquiring the economic resources to support a family, which in an 
industrial society could take time since completing even basic education means that a 
person will be in their late teens.  
 
From a life course perspective too these two variables are important. Completing 
schooling, getting a job, then getting married seems to be the preferred sequence in 
Indonesia. 
 
Our analysis examined the influence of these two structural variables in two ways: one by 
examining the characteristics of those who were married at IFLS1 compared to those who 
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were not. In another model we examined the determinants of who gets married between 
1993 and 1997 compared to who does not. The first model examines the first wave of 
IFLS cross-sectionally, while the second analysis examines a sample of people who were 
never married at time 1 to see if they got married by time 2 or not. We conducted both 
analyses for men and women since an understanding of marriage patterns requires an 
understanding of both parties in the marriage contract.  
 
The results from our analyses are interesting and we will summarize them here by linking 
them up with our hypotheses.  
 
Interpretation of the results on education: Using the life course perspective as a hook, we 
had included a variable on school enrollment. Our hypothesis stated that: 
Hypothesis 1: Being enrolled in school will decrease the odds of marriage for both men 
and women. 
 
Our results confirm our hypothesis and show that school enrollment does reduce the odds 
of marriage for both men and women. This result is in line with what has been found 
previously for Western Europe and the United States (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; 
Thornton et al. 1995; Xie et al. 2003; Copolla 2004).  
  
Our second hypothesis stated that: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of educational attainment will be associated with lowered 




We had included educational attainment because of its association with modernization 
theory in the developing country literature. While our results on the cross-sectional model 
indicated that educational levels reduced the odds of marriage for both men and women, 
our dynamic model shows that once school enrollment is controlled for, the effect of 
educational levels on the odds of marriage disappears for both men and women. This is 
contrary to our hypotheses.  We conclude from this result that it is really the amount of 
time spent in school that keeps people away from marriage rather than the accumulation 
of education. While this result is contradictory to what Malhotra (1997) found in her 
analysis of Central Java (her results showed that educational attainment lowered the 
likelihood of women’s marriage), it is again similar to what has been found for Western 
societies (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Xie et al. 2003; Copolla 2004). We can interpret 
these results the same way as it has been interpreted for the West: while people are in 
school, they are viewed as minors or youths, who are not capable of taking on the 
responsibilities of married life. This interpretation is linked to the life course perspective. 
 
We used our third hypothesis to test whether the social context in which people live has 
an effect on their marriage odds.  
Hypothesis 3: As the proportion of educated men and women in the province increases, 
the odds of marriage for both men and women will decrease.  
 
Our results show that for men it is still only individual characteristics that matter and 
context has no effect. So, even if a less educated man lives in a province where most men 
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are educated, it is still only his own characteristics that are going to matter for his 
marriage chances. For women, however, context has some effect in reducing their 
marriage odds, above their own personal characteristics. This means that if a less 
educated woman is living in a province where most women are educated, then her 
marriage chances will also reduce, as in the case of her better educated peers.  
 
The contextual results reinforce the results we obtained on education in our individual 
level logit models, but in the case of women, they show that contextual characteristics 
have some effect on their marriage chances.  
 
Interpretation of the results on work and earnings: We had the following hypotheses on 
workforce participation: 
Hypothesis 4: As men’s labor force participation increases, their odds of marriage will 
increase. 
Hypothesis 5: High earning men will have higher odds of getting married compared to 
men with lower incomes. 
Hypothesis 6: Increases in women’s labor force participation will not be associated with 
their odds of marriage. 
 
If we take hypothesis 4 and 6 (for men and women respectively), we can see that our 
results confirm the hypothesized relationship between men’s work and their marriage 
chances, but is contrary to our hypothesis on women. The latter is surprising since no 
previous research on developing countries has found a positive association between 
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women’s work and their marriage odds. Malhotra (1997) found that women’s work had 
no association with their risk of marriage. Even in the Western literature, Liefbroer and 
Corijn (1999) had found that unemployment actually helped women’s marriage odds in 
the Netherlands and Flanders, although Copolla (2004) found that for Italy and Spain 
women’s work did help their marriage chances.  
 
Before we drew any conclusions from these results, we also checked for those who work, 
if their earnings had an association with their odds of marriage. Here again our results 
were unusual. Earnings had no association with marriage chances for either men or 
women. Our hypothesis had predicted a positive association for men, and no relationship 
for women, given the evidence from previous studies (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Xie et 
al. 2003; Copolla 2004). When our results on workforce participation and earnings are 
seen in conjunction with each other, we conclude that being in the workforce matters for 
a person’s marriage chances, only because at this stage in their life they have transitioned 
to being adults who are capable of taking on the responsibilities of married life. The 
actual economic resources a person has don’t really matter. This conclusion is also linked 
to the life course perspective.  
 
Previous research has found the modernization paradigm inadequate for understanding 
delayed marriages in developing countries, but alternative frameworks within which 
results could be located don’t exist. Our interpretation of the results on both education 
and work draws heavily from the Western literature and underscores the utility of the life 
course perspective in understanding marriage timing.  Events such as marriage are a part 
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of a person’s life course that follows a normative sequence. People get married at that 
stage in their lives when they are considered ready for it. Our research shows that 
marriage is connected with what people are doing at specific stages of their lives in 
addition to their actual ages. If they are students, they are less likely to be married 
compared to when they are working. We argue that the life course perspective provides 
the best framework for understanding the process of marriage and non-marriage in 
Indonesia. 
 
Limitations of study: 
This analysis is not without its limitations. One drawback in this analysis was the lack of 
availability of complete retrospective data on work force participation and age at leaving 
school. This data would have helped us identify the exact timing of marriage relative to 
entry into the labor force and time since leaving school. It would also help us identify 
whether the results we are getting on education are being driven in part by a selection 
effect. As these retrospective data become available it should be possible to study 
marriage timing with event history methods. 
 
An analysis on marriage timing also requires an understanding of the cultural changes in 
a society. In most datasets cultural variables are not available since the focus is on 
structural variables. Data on cultural change are typically obtained from attitudinal data. 
Shifts in people’s attitudes on different issues generally reflect changes in cultural norms 
and values. On the issue of marriage, shifts in how people view late marriage, spousal 
self selection, and sexual relations outside of marriage could be indicative of the cultural 
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context in which changes in marital patterns are taking place. However, IFLS, like many 
datasets does not as yet collect data on people’s attitudes. This prevented us from 
understanding the cultural component of changes in marriage timing.  
 
Future research: 
Changes in marriage timing indicate fundamental changes in the social and cultural 
structure of a society. It can be associated with a shift from arranged marriages to one 
where people choose their own spouses; a shift from sexual relations within marriage to 
sexual relations prior to marriage; a shift in fertility patterns; shifts in marriage duration; 
and changing gender relations. Of all these changes mainly the shifts in fertility patterns 
have been analyzed in any detail. Changes in gender relations and spousal choice have 
been examined by Malhotra (1991 and 1997) and Gavin Jones (1981) has looked at 
changes in marriage duration. Otherwise, other correlates of changes in marriage timing, 
such as changes in age at sexual initiation have been ignored for Indonesia and indeed for 
most Asian countries.  
 
More research could also be done on how changes in the process of spouse selection and 
marriage duration are affecting children’s, men’s, and women’s educational and health 
outcomes. Research on Western societies shows that marriage timing and marriage 
duration are linked to educational and health outcomes for men, women, and children 
(see Waite 1995 and Cherlin 1990 for more on this). More research on this is needed for 




For my own research I would like to explore the possibility of age at sexual initiation 
becoming de-linked from the age at marriage. When sexual initiation occurs prior to 
marriage, there is a possibility of more complex sexual networks being set up in society. 
This becomes especially relevant given the spread of HIV/AIDS in Asia.  
 
Importance of this research: 
From a policy perspective this analysis has direct relevance for fertility limitation. The 
link between entry into marriage and fertility is well established, and our findings that 
men and women who are in school are less likely to be married indicates that keeping 
people in school longer would help in limiting fertility in a country that has fairly high 
fertility levels. From the perspective of HIV/AIDS, this research lays the ground for an 
exploration of the link between delays in marriage and disease transmission9.   
 
We believe however that this thesis’ contribution to sociology and social knowledge is a 
theoretical one. Most previous analyses have found the modernization framework to be 
insufficient in gaining a proper understanding of marriage in Indonesia. To the best of our 
knowledge, no other analysis on developing countries has located their analysis of 
marriage in the life course perspective. The incorporation of this perspective into our 
research question is a unique contribution of this thesis.  
                                                 
9 This research may also have direct policy relevance for HIV/AIDS. According to Mensch et al, (2005), 
delaying marriage as long as it delays sexual intercourse reduces the risk of HIV infection. There is 
evidence from sub-Saharan Africa to suggest that when marriage is delayed, there is lowered probability of 
sexual contact which reduces the prevalence of HIV. Additionally, research from sub-Saharan Africa 
suggests that unmarried sexually active adolescents have lower HIV risk since their married counterparts 
were less likely to use condoms and more likely to have older sexual partners (their husbands) who were 
more likely to be HIV positive. But as Mensch et al. state, these conclusions need to be approached 
cautiously since unmarried persons are also at greater risk of having multiple sexual partners, which would 





1.  Political map of Indonesia, 2005 
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Note: Ratios are for women per 100 men 
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Source: Indonesia census province data, 1991 
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Note: Singulate mean ages at marriage were computed using the method outlined in Shryock and Seigel 
(1976) 
 
























Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 
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Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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Primary JRHGen JRHVoc SRHGen SRHVoc
Diploma Univ
 
Note: Calculated from logistic model presented in table 7 which holds constant province, religion, and 
urban residence. 
 






















Primary JRHGen JRHVoc SRHGen SRHVoc Diploma Univ
 
Note: Calculated from logistic model presented in table 7 which holds constant province, religion, and 
urban residence. 
 





















Primary JRHG JRHV SRHG SRHV Diploma Univ
 
Note: Calculated from the logistic model presented in table 9 that holds constant work in the previous year, 
current school enrollment, family socioeconomic status, urban residence, family composition, religion, and 
province. 
 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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Primary JRHG JRHV SRHG SRHV Diploma Univ
 
Note: Calculated from the logistic model presented in table 9 that holds constant work in the previous year, 
current school enrollment, family socioeconomic status, urban residence, family composition, religion, and 
province. 
 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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15.  Estimates of percent of 21 year old women marrying between 1993 and 1997 by education level and 


















Note: Calculated from logistic model presented in table 10 that holds constant work in the previous year, 
age, family socioeconomic status, urban residence, family composition, religion, and province 
 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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16.  Estimates of percent of 29 year old men marrying between 1993 and 1997 by education level and 
















Note: Calculated from logistic model presented in table 10 that holds constant work in the previous year, 
age, family socioeconomic status, urban residence, family composition, religion, and province 
 





17.  Plot of the singulate mean age at marriage for women and percent of women who have completed 
above primary education, provinces in Indonesia 1991 
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Note: province names beginning in a capital letter represent the urban portion of that 
province. Province names beginning in a lower case letter represent the rural portion of 
that province. 
 
Source: 1991 Indonesian Census (Indonesia, 1991) 
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18.  Plot of the singulate mean age at marriage for men and percent of men who have completed above 
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Note: province names beginning in a capital letter represent the urban portion of that 
province. Province names beginning in a lower case letter represent the rural portion of 
that province. 
 




19.  Plot of the singulate mean age at marriage for women in Indonesia and their labor force participation 
rates, provinces in Indonesia 1991.  
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Note: province names beginning in a capital letter represent the urban portion of that 
province. Province names beginning in a lower case letter represent the rural portion of 
that province. 
 
Source: 1991 Indonesian Census (Indonesia, 1991) 
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20.  Plot of the singulate mean age at marriage for men and their labor force participation rates, provinces 
in Indonesia 1991 
 
    | 
    | 
 29 + 
    | 
    |                            Y 
    | 
    | 
    | 
    | 
 28 +         W 
    | 
    |          A 
    | 
    |                                 D 
a   | 
g   |             F                   B 
e 27+             S 
@   |                                 E 
m   |                    L K    C 
a   | 
r   | 
r   | 
i   |                        w 
a 26+                         J                                   y 
g   | 
e   |             N 
    | 
m   | 
a   |                              a 
l   | 
e 25+                                                 b 
    | 
    |                    f                l 
    |                                          k  c       e 
    | 
    | 
    |                                s 
 24 + 
    | 
    | 
    | 
    |                                  n 
    | 
    |                                   j 
 23 + 
    | 
    --+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------- 
     40           45           50           55           60           65 
 
                              men’s labor force participation 
 
Note: province names beginning in a capital letter represent the urban portion of that 
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1.  Percent of ever married people in different age  
 groups: Indonesia, 1993 
 






Age 12-15 1540 1.17 1551 0.13 
Age 16-17 707 11.74 683 1.02 
Age 18-19 609 27.42 577 4.16 
Age 20-21 597 49.41 541 13.68 
Age 22-23 520 60.19 455 25.49 
Age 24-25 570 75.79 496 54.03 
Age 26-27 455 84.18 411 61.80 
Age 28-30 819 89.87 698 83.81 






2.   Percent of ever married people in different age groups:   
 Indonesia, 1997 
 
     






Age 12-15 1909 2.20 1852 0.37 
Age 16-17 1024 12.70 965 1.14 
Age 18-19 997 25.48 903 6.53 
Age 20-21 937 43.44 848 14.86 
Age 22-23 805 59.75 741 28.74 
Age 24-25 789 70.22 742 47.30 
Age 26-27 674 80.56 612 55.39 
Age 28-30 1083 89.10 998 78.06 





3.  Demographic profile of Indonesia, 2001 
 
Population growth rate 1.45% 
  
TFR 2.44 children per woman 
  
IMR 35.6/ 1000 live births 
  
Life expectancy at birth (female) 72.13 years 
  
Life expectancy at birth (male)  67.13 years 
  
Sex ratio (working age population) 1:1 
  
Literacy (total population) 87.9% 
 
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2005 
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4.   Maximum likelihood logit estimates of the odds of women and men  
 being married in 1993, on age: Indonesia, 1993 
 
     
Parameter Estimate for women Estimate for men 
          
Intercept -0.0235   -1.8423 *** 
Age 12-15 -4.4139 *** -4.8099 *** 
Age 16-17 -1.9939 *** -2.728 *** 
Age 18-19 -0.9499 *** -1.295 *** 
Age 22-23 0.4369 *** 0.7699 *** 
Age 24-25 1.1646 *** 2.0039 *** 
Age 26-27 1.6948 *** 2.3234 *** 
Age 28-30 2.2058 *** 3.4865 *** 
Chi-sq. 3388.6624 *** 2929.7872 *** 
N 5817  5412  
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 




5.  Percent people who married between 1993 and 1997 by  
 age group: Indonesia 1993, 1997 
 
     






age1213 70 9.14 11 1.37 
age1415 144 19.49 45 6.06 
age1617 202 32.63 68 10.19 
age1819 173 39.32 126 22.87 
age2021 127 42.19 136 29.12 
age2223 94 45.85 123 36.50 
age2425 69 50.00 97 42.73 
age2627 34 41.22 82 52.23 
age2830 21 25.61 58 51.33 





6.  Maximum Likelihood Logit Estimates of the Odds of Women's  
 and Men's Marriage between 1993 and 1997 on Age: Indonesia, 1993  








          
Intercept -0.315 *** -0.8895 *** 
Age 12-13 -1.982 *** -3.3844 *** 
Age 14-15 -1.104 *** -1.8521 *** 
Age 16-17 -0.410 ** -1.2863 *** 
Age 18-19 -0.119   -0.3263 ** 
Age 22-23 0.149   0.3357 ** 
Age 24-25 0.315   0.5966 *** 
Age 26-27 0.204   0.9787 *** 
Age 28-30 -0.752 *** 0.9426 *** 
Chi-sq. 327.2427 *** 697.5137  *** 
N 3362  4063  
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 
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7.  Maximum likelihood logit estimates of the odds of women and men being  
married in 1993 on selected independent variables: Indonesia, 1993 
     
Parameter 
Estimate 
 for Women  
Estimate 
for Men  
          
Intercept 0.8755 *** -1.699 *** 
Junior high general -0.3551 *** -0.2913 * 
Junior high vocational -0.8836 *** -0.272   
Senior high general -1.8028 *** -0.8449 *** 
Senior high vocational -1.6525 *** -1.1126 *** 
Diploma -2.2532 *** -2.0428 *** 
University -2.8132 *** -1.9704 *** 
Age 12-15 -5.1405 *** -5.1281 *** 
Age 16-17 -2.3198 *** -2.8082 *** 
Age 18-19 -1.0367 *** -1.3083 *** 
Age 22-23 0.7598 *** 0.901 *** 
Age 24-25 1.4275 *** 2.2233 *** 
Age 26-27 2.2287 *** 2.7574 *** 
Age 28-30 2.4884 *** 3.8969 *** 
Urban residence -0.7919 *** -0.5183 *** 
Hindu -0.1511   0.6577   
Buddhist 0.0254   -1.2573   
Christian -0.5187 ** -0.8608 *** 
N. Sumatra -0.3413 † 0.4603 * 
W.Sumatra -0.2932   -0.5535 ** 
S. Sumatra 0.0846   0.5702 ** 
Lampung 0.519 * 0.3633   
W. Java 0.679 *** 0.8688 *** 
C. Java 0.5156 *** 0.2516   
Yogjakarta -0.1022   -0.0837   
E. Java 0.7158 *** 0.6304 *** 
Bali 0.1415   0.4755   
West Nusa Tengarra 0.0695   0.7384 *** 
S. Kalimantan 0.8134 *** 0.8835 *** 
Sulawesi -0.3322   0.8369 *** 
Chi-sq. 4281.6254 *** 3307.1309 *** 
N 5817  5412  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 
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8.  Maximum likelihood logit estimates of age and education level interactions  







          
Intercept -20.726 *** -19.617 *** 
JRH General -5.811 * -2.028   
JRH Vocational 0.780   -5.765   
SRH General -7.139   -4.867   
SRH Vocational -3.872   -3.898   
Diploma -3.268   -44.799   
University -19.709   4.273   
Age 1.626 *** 1.196 *** 
Age sq. -0.028 *** -0.016 *** 
Age * JRH General 0.465   0.007   
Age sq. * JRH General -0.009   0.003   
Age * JRH Vocational -0.183   0.351   
Age sq. * JRH Vocational 0.005   -0.005   
Age * SRH General 0.365   0.264   
Age sq. * SRH General  -0.006   -0.004   
Age * SRH Vocational 0.096   0.109   
Age sq.* SRH Vocational 0.000   0.000   
Age * Diploma -0.151   3.205   
Age sq. * Diploma 0.008   -0.059   
Age * University 1.156   -0.609   
Age sq. * University -0.019   0.014   
Hindu -0.171   0.750   
Buddhist -0.002   -1.180   
Christian -0.537 *** -0.928 *** 
Urban Residence -0.786 *** -0.536 *** 
N. Sumatra -0.338 † 0.520 * 
W. Sumatra -0.309   -0.535 * 
S. Sumatra 0.070   0.570 * 
Lampung 0.521 * 0.385   
W. Java 0.689 *** 0.881 *** 
C. Java 0.518 *** 0.261   
Yogjakarta -0.081   -0.100   
E. Java 0.722 *** 0.657 *** 
Bali 0.168   0.437   
West Nusa Tenggarra 0.091   0.800 *** 
S. Kalimantan 0.888 *** 0.885 *** 
Sulawesi -0.326   0.896 *** 
Chi-sq. 4348.054 *** 3361.893 *** 
N 5817  5412  
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 
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9.  Maximum likelihood logit estimates of the odds of women’s and  
men’s marriage between 1993 and 1997 on selected independent  
variables: Indonesia, 1993-1997 
 






     
Intercept 0.313  -0.9662 *** 
Worked last year 0.3624 *** 0.5712 *** 
Currently enrolled Y/N  -1.2526 *** -1.1395 *** 
Junior High General 0.1748  -0.3391 ** 
Junior High Vocational 0.3777  -0.2876  
Senior High General 0.1663  -0.2552  
Senior High Vocational 0.3941 * 0.0348  
Diploma 0.4434  0.6439  
University 0.6124 * 0.3061  
Age 12-13 -1.1961 *** -2.2543 *** 
Age 14-15 -0.5231 ** -1.2646 *** 
Age 16-17 0.0846  -0.8005 *** 
Age 18-19 0.1166  -0.046  
Age 22-23 0.131  0.3007 † 
Age 24-25 0.1108  0.4282 * 
Age 26-27 -0.1152  0.7299 *** 
Age 28-30 -0.9023 *** 0.7807 *** 
Socioeconomic Status -0.0205  -0.00358  
Urban -0.465 *** -0.1007  
Number Younger Sisters 0.0473  0.00825  
Number Older Brothers -0.1797 * -0.179  
Number Younger Brothers -0.0171  0.0692 * 
Number Old Sisters -0.1926 * -0.5393 *** 
Co-residence with Parents 0.0392  -0.2634 * 
Hindu 0.4731  0.0581  
Buddhist 0.0353  -1.456 * 
Christians -0.5766 *** -0.462 * 
N. Sumatra -0.5414 ** 0.3105  
W. Sumatra -0.439 * 0.1329  
S. Sumatra -0.0542  0.7136 *** 
Lampung 0.054  0.503 * 
W. Java -0.109  0.6693 *** 
C. Java -0.6683 *** 0.0251  
Yogjakarta -0.5508 ** -0.1389  
E. Java -0.3048  0.2908  
Bali  -1.0708 * 0.5426  
West Nusa Tengarra -0.3919 † 0.6065 ** 
S. Kalimantan -0.0035  0.3787  
Sulawesi  -0.76 *** 0.0299  
Chi-sq. 569.8412 *** 841.3893 *** 
N 2873  3442  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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10.  Maximum likelihood logit estimates of age and education level  
interactions on the odds of Indonesian men and women getting  
married between 1993 and 1997: Indonesia, 1993-1997 
 






     
Intercept -10.6975 *** -12.2065 *** 
Worked last year 0.329 *** 0.5226 *** 
Currently Enrolled in School -0.9312 *** -0.9463 *** 
JRH General -2.4652  -1.407  
JRH Vocational 2.9332  9.6184  
SRH General 0.8724  8.0117 † 
SRH Vocational 4.039  7.5386  
Diploma -8.8782  26.7116  
University 6.0878  -0.6346  
Age 1.1592 *** 0.9985 *** 
Age Sq. -0.0298 *** -0.0215 *** 
Age * JRH General 0.1779  -0.0111  
Age sq. * JRH General -0.00166  0.00305  
Age * JRH Vocational -0.3302  -1.2547  
Age sq. * JRH Vocational 0.00962  0.0365  
Age * SRH General -0.2366  -0.9197 * 
Age sq. * SRH General 0.00969  0.0243  
Age * SRH Vocational -0.4726  -0.8192 † 
Age sq. * SRH Vocational 0.014  0.0214 * 
Age * Diploma 0.5029  -2.2105  
Age sq. * Diploma -0.00375  0.0464  
Age * University -0.772  -0.1029  
Age sq. * University 0.0229  0.00609  
SES -0.0186  -0.0028  
Urban Residence -0.443 *** -0.1388  
Number Younger Sisters 0.0385  0.011  
Number Older Brothers -0.1903 ** -0.1809  
Number Younger Brothers -0.0225  0.0668 † 
Number Older Sisters -0.1931 * -0.475 *** 
Live with parents 0.0485  -0.2599 * 
Hindu 0.3654  0.2392  
Buddhist 0.0235  -1.443 * 
Christian -0.5983 *** -0.473 * 
N. Sumatra -0.5402 * 0.4274 † 
W. Sumatra -0.4696 * 0.1878  
S. Sumatra -0.0488  0.711 *** 
Lampung -0.036  0.5525 * 
W. Java -0.1047  0.7341 *** 
C. Java -0.6558 *** 0.0569  
Yogjakarta -0.5324 * -0.0128  
E. Java -0.2987  0.3375  
Bali  -0.9564 † 0.4913  
West Nusa Tenggarra -0.4156 † 0.6996 *** 
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S. Kalimantan 0.0454  0.4131  
Sulawesi  -0.7138 *** 0.108  
Chi-sq. 589.1784 *** 868.7872 *** 
N 2873   3442   
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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11.  Maximum likelihood logit estimates of school enrolment and  
 education level interactions on the odds of Indonesian men and women  
 getting married between 1993 and 1997:  Indonesia, 1993-1997 






     
Intercept -8.24 *** -8.3419 ***
Worked last year 0.3727 *** 0.5675 ***
Currently Enrolled in School -0.9956 *** -1.417 ***
JRH General 0.3264 * -0.2661 † 
JRH Vocational -0.4021  -0.3784  
SRH General 0.1016  -0.2694  
SRH Vocational 0.28  -0.00939  
Diploma 0.6121  0.5019  
University 1.1262 *** 0.0421  
Age 0.8389 *** 0.5613 ***
Age Sq. -0.0201 *** -0.00975 ***
Enrollment * JRH General -0.513 * -0.2895  
Enrollment * JRH Vocational 1.0241  0.7577  
Enrollment * SRH General -0.1154  0.2985  
Enrollment * SRH Vocational 0.0713  0.5301  
Enrollment * Diploma -1.1731  0.7243  
Enrollment * University -1.1374 * 0.7613  
SES -0.0205  0.000423  
Urban Residence -0.4436 *** -0.1134  
Number Younger Sisters 0.0486  0.00655  
Number Older Brothers -0.1892 * -0.1801  
Number Younger Brothers -0.0109  0.0706 * 
Number Older Sisters -0.1771 * -0.5368 ***
Live with Parents 0.0397  -0.266 * 
Hindu 0.4377  0.0847  
Buddhist 0.0338  -1.4525 * 
Christian -0.6007 *** -0.4287 * 
N. Sumatra -0.5013 ** 0.3562  
W. Sumatra -0.4402 * 0.1484  
S. Sumatra -0.0204  0.7299 ***
Lampung 0.035  0.5629 * 
W. Java -0.0594  0.6929 ***
C. Java -0.6201 *** 0.0546  
Yogjakarta -0.5516 ** -0.1065  
E. Java -0.2724  0.3095  
Bali  -1.0127 * 0.5521  
West Nusa Tenggarra -0.3784  0.653 ***
S. Kalimantan 0.0713  0.3693  
Sulawesi  -0.7319 *** 0.0653  
Chi-sq. 574.8070 *** 841.8994 ***
N 2873   3442   
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
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Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey, 1993 and 1997 
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12.  Summary statistics for selected variables are the province level: Indonesia, 1991 
 
      
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Age at marriage female (SMAM) 25 22.6 1.8 18.8 25.5 
Age at marriage male (SMAM) 25 25.9 1.5 23.1 28.7 
Percent currently married female 25 46.3 6.2 36.1 58.8 
Percent currently married male 25 36.5 4.4 28.6 45.1 
Percent never married female 25 50.8 6.9 36.4 61.7 
Percent never married male 25 62.6 4.7 53.2 71.0 
Percent divorced females 25 2.0 0.9 0.9 4.0 
Percent divorced males 25 0.7 0.3 0.3 1.6 
Percent women’s labor force participation 25 29.6 9.3 17.5 53.8 
Percent men’s labor force participation 25 51.0 5.2 42.9 63.1 
Percent females with above primary 25 42.3 9.7 27.0 61.6 
Percent males with above primary 25 50.1 10.7 33.4 66.3 
Assets index 25 324.7 280.6 25.4 721.0 
 
Source: 1991 Indonesian Census  
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13.  Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables at the Province Level: Indonesia 1991 
      
Women 







above primary Girls in school 
            
Age at marriage female 1.00 -0.96 -0.27 0.83 0.88 
           
            
Currently married female  -0.96 1.00 0.38 -0.86 -0.89 
           
            
Women’s labor force participation -0.27 0.38 1.00 -0.59 -0.51 
           
            
Percent females with above primary  0.83 -0.86 -0.59 1.00 0.96 
           
            
Girls in school  0.88 -0.89 -0.51 0.96 1.00 
           
      












            
Age at marriage male  1.00 -0.89 -0.50 0.88 0.90 
           
            
Currently married male -0.89 1.00 0.69 -0.86 -0.93 
           
            
Men’s labor force participation -0.50 0.69 1.00 -0.74 -0.75 
           
           
Percent males with above primary  0.88 -0.86 -0.74 1.00 0.94 
           
            
Boys in school  0.90 -0.93 -0.75 0.94 1.00 
           
Source: 1991 Indonesian Census 
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14.  Logistic regression results for multi-level models predicting the  
 effect of education and region of residence on the odds of men’s  
 marriage: Indonesia, 1991 and 1993 
 
   
Fixed Effect Model 1   Model 2   
   
Macro level effects on  
men's odds of marriage     
     
Intercept -1.889 *** -1.499 *** 
 (0.132)  (-0.157)  
     
Percent men with  
primary plus education -0.043 * -0.046 * 
 (0.022)  (0.02)  
     
Rural dummy -0.021  -0.368  
 (0.466)  (0.423)  
     
Micro level effects on  
men's odds of marriage     
     
Junior high general   -0.285 † 
   (0.16)  
     
Junior high vocational   -0.281  
   (0.437)  
     
Senior high general   -0.818 *** 
   (0.153)  
     
Senior high vocational   -1.095 *** 
   (0.137)  
     
Diploma   -1.991 *** 
   (0.33)  
     
University   -1.946 *** 
   (0.171)  
     
Christian -1.156 *** -0.804 ** 
 (0.37)  (0.314)  
     
Hindu 0.414  0.591 † 
 (0.263)  (0.347)  
     
Buddhist -1.019 *** -1.192 ** 
 (0.276)  (0.504)  
     
Age 12-15 -4.888 *** -5.109 *** 
 (0.527)  (0.542)  
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Age 16-17 -2.765 *** -2.799 *** 
 (0.319)  (0.325)  
     
Age 18-19 -1.311 *** -1.307 *** 
 (0.211)  (0.226)  
     
Age 22-23 0.852 *** 0.896 *** 
 (0.179)  (0.181)  
     
Age 24-25 2.078 *** 2.176 *** 
 (0.136)  (0.161)  
     
Age 26-27 2.51 *** 2.697 *** 
 (0.142)  (0.156)  
     
Age 28-30 3.638 *** 3.8 *** 
  (0.15)   (0.157)   
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey and 1991 Indonesian Census 
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15.  Logistic regression results for multi-level models predicting the effect of  
 education and region of residence on the odds of women’s marriage:  
 Indonesia, 1991 and 1993 
 
      
Fixed Effect Model 1   Model 2   
     
Macro level effects on women's 
odds of marriage     
     
Intercept -0.746 *** -0.176  
 (0.086)  (0.109)  
     
Percent women with primary  
plus education -0.048 *** -0.046 *** 
 (0.011)  (0.009)  
     
Rural dummy 0.16  -0.217  
 (0.228)  (0.198)  
     
Micro level effects on women's 
odds of marriage     
     
JRH general   -0.419 *** 
   (0.109)  
     
JRH Vocational   -0.738 ** 
   (0.317)  
     
SRH General   -1.414 *** 
   (0.128)  
     
SRH vocational   -1.449 *** 
   (0.132)  
     
Diploma   -2.034 *** 
   (0.237)  
     
University   -2.413 *** 
   (0.188)  
     
Christian -0.981 *** -0.581 ** 
 (0.294)  (0.225)  
     
Hindu -0.126 † 0.072  
 (0.073)  (0.082)  
     
Buddhist -0.855 *** -0.714 *** 
 (0.202)  (0.089)  
     
Age 12-15 -4.456 *** -4.756 *** 
 (0.17)  (0.179)  
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Age 16-17 -2.007 *** -2.08 *** 
 (0.11)  (0.126)  
     
Age 18-19 -0.915 *** -0.937 *** 
 (0.081)  (0.095)  
     
Age 22-23 0.575 *** 0.667 *** 
 (0.086)  (0.102)  
     
Age 24-25 1.43 *** 1.573 *** 
 (0.094)  (0.117)  
     
Age 26-27 1.918 *** 2.158 *** 
 (0.085)  (0.105)  
     
Age 28-30 2.785 *** 2.913 *** 
  (0.095)   (0.114)   
 
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey and 1991 Indonesian Census 
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16.  Logistic regression results for multi-level models predicting the effects of education and region  
 of residence on men’s odds of marriage between 1993 and 1997: Indonesia, 1993-1997 
         
Fixed Effect         Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
         
Macro level effects on the odds of 
men's marriage         
         
Intercept -0.78 *** -0.774 *** -0.892 *** -0.887 *** 
 (0.126)  (0.13)  (0.215)  (0.218)  
         
Percent men with primary 
plus education -0.018 **   -0.008    
 (0.007)    (0.007)    
         
Rural dummy   0.362 **   0.135  
   (0.149)    (0.141)  
Micro level effects on the 
odds of men's marriage         
         
Working     0.574 *** 0.574 *** 
     (0.146)  (0.146)  
         
Currently enrolled in school     -1.078 *** -1.08 *** 
     (0.115)  (0.116)  
         
JRH General     -0.338 ** -0.339 *** 
     (0.13)  (0.13)  
         
JRH Vocational     -0.246  -0.248  
     (0.371)  (0.374)  
         
SRH General     -0.241 *** -0.244 *** 
     (0.083)  (0.082)  
         
SRH Vocational     -0.066  -0.069  
     (0.109)  (0.111)  
         
Diploma     0.251  0.253  
     (0.244)  (0.245)  
         
University     0.052  0.051  
     (0.177)  (0.172)  
         
Christian -0.623 *** -0.648 *** -0.536 *** -0.548 *** 
 (0.167)  (0.156)  (0.161)  (0.157)  
         
Hindu -0.082  -0.085  0.117  0.117  
 (0.32)  (0.311)  (0.332)  (0.325)  
         
Buddhist -1.394 *** -1.402 *** -1.345 *** -1.351 *** 
 (0.248)  (0.238)  (0.368)  (0.361)  
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Age 12-13 -3.464 *** -3.463 *** -2.507 *** -2.507 *** 
 (0.305)  (0.306)  (0.296)  (0.297)  
         
Age 14-15 -2.053 *** -2.051 *** -1.424 *** -1.423 *** 
 (0.174)  (0.177)  (0.176)  (0.178)  
         
Age 16-17 -1.353 *** -1.351 *** -0.903 *** -0.901 *** 
 (0.156)  (0.155)  (0.172)  (0.171)  
         
Age 18-19 -0.33 ** -0.33 ** -0.056  -0.055  
 (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.15)  (0.149)  
         
Age 22-23 0.387 ** 0.386 ** 0.369 * 0.369 * 
 (0.181)  (0.18)  (0.196)  (0.196)  
         
Age 24-25 0.642 *** 0.641 *** 0.482 *** 0.482 *** 
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  
         
Age 26-27 1.111 *** 1.108 *** 0.868 *** 0.866 *** 
 (0.183)  (0.182)  (0.172)  (0.172)  
         
Age 28-30 1.137 *** 1.134 *** 0.807 *** 0.805 *** 
  (0.189)   (0.19)   (0.172)   (0.172)   
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: 1993 and 1997 Indonesian Family Life Survey and 1991 Indonesian Census 
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17.  Logistic regression results for multi-level models predicting the effect of education and region of  
 residence on women’s odds of marriage between 1993 and 1997, Indonesia, 1993-1997 
          
Fixed Effect Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
         
Macro level effects on the  
odds of women's marriage         
          
Intercept -0.166  -0.171  -0.283 * -0.291 * 
 (0.118)  (0.102)  (0.138)  (0.129)  
         
Percent women with  
primary plus education -0.033 ***  -0.025 ***  
 (0.008)    (0.007)    
         
Rural dummy   0.642 ***  0.492 *** 
   (0.148)    (0.124)  
Micro level effects on the  
odds of women's marriage         
         
Working     0.221 ** 0.225 ** 
     (0.1)  (0.101)  
         
Currently enrolled in school     -1.278 *** -1.282 *** 
     (0.137)  (0.139)  
         
JRH General     0.139  0.139  
     (0.123)  (0.123)  
         
JRH Vocational     0.224  0.223  
     (0.354)  (0.345)  
         
SRH general     0.147  0.156  
     (0.106)  (0.106)  
         
SRH Vocational      0.36  0.365 + 
     (0.22)  (0.219)  
         
Diploma     0.479 * 0.502 * 
     (0.239)  (0.241)  
         
University     0.299  0.323  
     (0.236)  (0.231)  
         
Christian -0.606 *** -0.635 *** -0.534 *** -0.572 *** 
 (0.124)  (0.134)  (0.14)  (0.156)  
         
Hindu -0.232  -0.156  -0.186  -0.129  
 (0.277)  (0.25)  (0.246)  (0.226)  
         
Buddhist -0.158  -0.189  0.029  -0.003  
 (0.35)  (0.344)  (0.285)  (0.285)  
 
 140
         
Age 12-13 -2.228 *** -2.227 *** -1.168 *** -1.157 *** 
 (0.201)  (0.204)  (0.222)  (0.224)  
         
Age 14-15 -1.245 *** -1.242 *** -0.553 *** -0.543 *** 
 (0.147)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.171)  
         
Age 16-17 -0.507 *** -0.505 *** 0.035  0.043  
 (0.169)  (0.17)  (0.158)  (0.158)  
         
Age 18-19 -0.166  -0.165  0.131  0.134  
 (0.122)  (0.12)  (0.126)  (0.125)  
         
Age 22-23 0.215  0.218  0.128  0.129  
 (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.174)  (0.174)  
         
Ahe 24-25 0.25  0.265 † 0.102  0.116  
 (0.156)  (0.157)  (0.152)  (0.153)  
         
Age 26-27 0.257  0.261  -0.005  -0.006  
 (0.277)  (0.275)  (0.248)  (0.247)  
         
Age 28-30 -0.681 ** -0.67 ** -0.922 *** -0.912 *** 
  (0.281)   (0.28)   (0.265)   (0.262)   
 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 




18. Maximum likelihood logit estimates of selected independent variables on the odds of marriage for  
 earning people between 1993  and 1997: Indonesia, 1993-1997 
 










         
Intercept -0.6783  -1.0919  -0.7737  -0.9893  
log of wage  0.0989  0.07  0.0918  0.0743  
Junior high general 0.0117  -0.0185  -0.0329  0.0152  
Junior high vocational 0.6531  -0.1046  0.5984  -0.0632  
Senior high general 0.4701  -0.2254  0.4096  -0.1949  
Senior high vocational 0.3987  0.2623  0.3359  0.3192  
Diploma 0.3736  -0.8992  0.2504  -0.8032  
University 0.8577  -0.6198  0.6451  -0.6172  
Age 12-13 -0.9543  -1.5279 * -0.9775  -1.5422 * 
Age 14-15 -0.4106  -0.784 * -0.4071  -0.8634 * 
Age 16-17 0.246  -1.2542 *** 0.2464  -1.255 *** 
Age 18-19 -0.0624  -0.2643  -0.0808  -0.2444  
Age 22-23 0.2344  0.0405  0.2698  0.0408  
Age 24-25 -0.1382  -0.0804  -0.1718  -0.1063  
Age 26-27 -0.00268  0.589 * 0.0254  0.5766 † 
Age 28-30 -1.0012 * 0.9257 ** -0.9769 * 0.9064  
Socioeconomic status     0.0344  -0.0308  
Urban -0.5883 ** 0.00171  -0.6137 ** 0.00179  
Number younger sisters 0.2032 ** -0.0198  0.2018 ** -0.0234  
Number older brothers -0.2121  -0.0358  -0.211  -0.019  
Number younger brothers -0.0236  0.0595  -0.0278  0.0581  
Number older sisters -0.1827  -0.5246 * -0.1854  -0.5027 * 
Co-residence with parents -0.1343  -0.3795 * -0.1152  -0.4148 * 
Buddhist 0.7489  -0.2046  0.7334  -0.0744  
Christian -0.8443 ** -0.4866  -0.8419 ** -0.413  
N. Sumatra -0.0249  0.3289  0.0261  0.3418  
W. Sumatra -0.2298  -0.1854  -0.1766  -0.1761  
S. Sumatra 1.1782  0.4423  1.2184  0.4422  
Lampung -2.0574 † 0.5585  -1.9924 † 0.5214  
W. Java -0.3774  0.7328 ** -0.2955  0.7264 ** 
C. Java -0.4073  0.5004  -0.3475  0.4975  
Yogjakarta -0.5951  -0.7968  -0.5547  -0.779  
E. Java -0.3524  0.1084  -0.2865  0.1215  
Bali  -1.1335 ** 0.852 * -1.1481 * 0.8821 * 
West Nusa Tengarra -0.8894  0.7431 † -0.8152  0.639  
S. Kalimantan 1.2789  0.4575  1.3458  0.4047  
S. Sulawesi -0.8588 † -0.4832  -0.8243 † -0.4956  
Chi-sq 60.1953 *** 73.4907 *** 59.2307 *** 72.6882 *** 
N  505    675    505    675   
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: 1993 and 1997 Indonesian Family Life Survey  
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19.  Maximum likelihood logit estimates of selected independent variables on the odds of marriage  
 between 1993 and 1997: Indonesia 1993-1997 
 
         
  Model 1   Model 2   
 SES Only   SES + Family Structure   
Parameter Women   Men   Women   Men   
         
Intercept 0.857 *** -0.554 *** 0.906 *** -0.347  
Worked last year         
Enrolled in school         
Junior high general         
Junior high vocational         
Senior high general         
Senior high vocational         
Diploma         
University         
Age 12-13 -2.272 *** -3.517 *** -2.21 *** -3.372 *** 
Age 14-15 -1.29 *** -2.06 *** -1.239 *** -1.951 *** 
Age 16-17 -0.534 *** -1.36 *** -0.493 *** -1.293 *** 
Age 18-19 -0.176  -0.325 ** -0.15  -0.3 * 
Age 22-23 0.247  0.419 *** 0.25  0.391 ** 
Age 24-25 0.301  0.696 *** 0.239  0.662 *** 
Age 26-27 0.318  1.179 *** 0.264  1.122 *** 
Age 28-30 -0.673  1.218 *** -0.761 ** 1.185 *** 
Socioeconomic status -0.067 *** -0.077 *** -0.061 *** -0.068 *** 
Urban residence -0.54 *** -0.248 ** -0.517 *** -0.212 * 
Number younger sisters     0.059 † 0.005  
Number older brothers     -0.266 *** -0.155  
Number younger brothers     0.002  0.049  
Number older sisters     -0.18 ** -0.553 *** 
Co-residence with parents     -0.081  -0.33 *** 
Hindu 0.236  -0.349  0.191  -0.331  
Buddhist -0.019  -1.403 * -0.007  -1.415 * 
Christian -0.624 *** -0.562 ** -0.623 *** -0.596 *** 
N. Sumatra  -0.568 *** 0.164  -0.59 *** 0.221  
W. Sumatra -0.715 *** -0.028  -0.713 *** -0.062  
S. Sumatra -0.365 † 0.613 ** -0.358 † 0.619 ** 
Lampung -0.25  0.453 * -0.203  0.405  
W. Java 0.008  0.681 *** -0.027  0.65 *** 
C. Java -0.603 *** 0.002  -0.65 *** 0.006  
Yogjakarta -0.583 *** -0.413 † -0.619 *** -0.391  
E. Java -0.214  0.134  -0.26  0.14  
Bali -0.878 * 0.655  -0.874 * 0.616  
West Nusa Tengarra -0.399 * 0.567 ** -0.445 ** 0.572 ** 
S. Kalimantan -0.045  0.405  -0.065  0.37  
S. Sulawesi -0.7 *** 0  -0.72 *** -0.014  
chi-sq 440.39 *** 803.11 *** 467 *** 833.59 *** 
N 3303   3987   3300   3985   
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
Source: 1993 and 1997 Indonesian Family Life Survey  
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19.   Maximum likelihood logit estimates of selected independent  
variables on the odds of marriage between  
1993 and 1997: Indonesia, 1993-1997 – Continued  
 
     
  Model 3   
 All  
Parameter Women   Men   
     
Intercept 0.313  -0.966 *** 
Worked last year 0.362 *** 0.571 *** 
Enrolled in school -1.253 *** -1.14 *** 
Junior high general 0.175  -0.339 * 
Junior high vocational 0.378  -0.288  
Senior high general 0.166  -0.255  
Senior high vocational 0.394 ** 0.035  
Diploma 0.443  0.644  
University 0.612 * 0.306  
Age 12-13 -1.196 *** -2.254 *** 
Age 14-15 -0.523 *** -1.265 *** 
Age 16-17 0.085  -0.801 *** 
Age 18-19 0.117  -0.046  
Age 22-23 0.131  0.301 † 
Age 24-25 0.111  0.428 * 
Age 26-27 -0.115  0.73 *** 
Age 28-30 -0.902 *** 0.781 *** 
Socioeconomic status -0.021  -0.004  
Urban residence -0.465 *** -0.101  
Number younger sisters 0.047  0.008  
Number older brothers -0.18 * -0.179  
Number younger brothers -0.017  0.069 † 
Number older sisters -0.193 * -0.539 *** 
Co-residence with parents 0.039  -0.263 * 
Hindu 0.473  0.058  
Buddhist 0.035  -1.456 * 
Christian -0.577 ** -0.462 * 
N. Sumatra  -0.541 ** 0.311  
W. Sumatra -0.439 * 0.133  
S. Sumatra -0.054  0.714 ** 
Lampung 0.054  0.503 † 
W. Java -0.109  0.669 *** 
C. Java -0.668 *** 0.025  
Yogjakarta -0.551 ** -0.139  
E. Java -0.305  0.291  
Bali -1.071 * 0.543  
West Nusa Tengarra -0.392 † 0.607 * 
S. Kalimantan -0.004  0.379  
S. Sulawesi -0.76 *** 0.03  
chi-sq 569.84 *** 841.39 *** 
N 2873   3442   
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 †p<0.1 
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